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 Summary 
The 1996 Constitution provides in s 25(7) that individuals and communities who 
had been dispossessed of rights in land after 19 June 1913, as a result of past 
discriminatory laws, may claim restitution or equitable redress. The Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 reiterates the 1913 cut-off date for restitution claims. 
The cut-off date appears to preclude pre-1913 land dispossessions. Various 
reasons are cited for this date, the most obvious being that  it reflects the date on 
which the Black Land Act came into effect. The Richtersveld and Popela 
decisions of the lower courts appear to confirm the view that historically based 
land claims for dispossessions that occurred prior to 1913 are excluded from the 
restitution process. 
 
In Australia and Canada restitution orders have been made possible by the 
judicially crafted doctrine of aboriginal land rights. However, historical restitution 
claims based on this doctrine are constrained by the assumption that the Crown, 
in establishing title during colonisation, extinguished all existing titles to land. This 
would have meant that the indigenous proprietary systems would have been lost 
irrevocably through colonisation. In seeking to overcome the sovereignty issue, 
Australian and Canadian courts have distinguished between the loss of 
sovereignty and the loss of title to land. In this way, the sovereignty of the Crown 
is left intact while restitution orders are rendered possible.  
 
South African courts do not have to grapple with the sovereignty issue since 
post-apartheid legislation authorises the land restitution process. The appeal 
decisions in Richtersveld and Popela recognised that some use rights survived 
the colonial dispossession of ownership. This surviving right was later the subject 
of a second dispossession under apartheid. By using this construction, which is 
not unlike the logic of the doctrine of aboriginal title in fragmenting proprietary 
interests, the second dispossession could then be said to meet the 1913 cut-off 
date, so that all historically based land claims are not necessarily excluded by the 
1913 cut-off date. However, it is still possible that some pre-1913 dispossessions 
 could not be brought under the umbrella of the Richtersveld and Popela 
construction, and the question whether historically based restitution claims are 
possible despite the 1913 cut-off date will resurface, especially if the claimants 
are not accommodated in the government’s land redistribution programme. 
 
 
 Opsomming 
Die 1996 Grondwet bepaal in a 25(7) dat individue en gemeenskappe wat na 19 
Junie 1913 van ‘n reg in grond ontneem is, as gevolg van rasgebaseerde 
wetgewing en praktyke, geregtig is om herstel van sodanige regte of 
gelykwaardige vergoeding te eis. Die Wet op Herstel van Grondregte 22 van 
1994herhaal die 1913-afsnydatum vir grondeise. Dit lyk dus asof die afsnydatum 
die ontneming van grond voor 1913 uitsluit. Verskeie redes word vir hierdie 
datum aangevoer, waarvan die bekendste is dat dit die datum is waarop die 
Swart Grond Wet in werking getree het. Dit beslissing van die laer howe in beide 
die Richtersveld- en die Popela-beslissings bevestig blykbaar dat ontneming van 
grond of regte in grond voor 1913 van die restitusie-proses uitgesluit word. 
 
In Australië en Kanada is restitusiebevele moontlik gemaak deur die leerstuk van 
inheemse grondregte. Historiese restitusie-eise in hierdie jurisdiksies word egter 
aan bande gelê deur die veronderstelling dat die Kroon, deur die vestiging van 
titel gedurende  kolonialisering, alle vorige titels op die grond uitgewis het. Dit 
sou beteken dat die inheemsregtelike grondregsisteme onherroeplik verlore 
geraak het deur kolonialisering. Ten einde die soewereiniteitsprobleem te 
oorkom het die Australiese en Kanadese howe onderskei tussen die verlies van 
soewereiniteit en die verlies van titel tot die grond. Op hierdie wyse word die 
soewereiniteit van die Kroon onaangeraak gelaat terwyl restitusiebevele steeds 
‘n moontlikheid is. 
 
Suid-Afrikaanse howe het nie nodig gehad om die soewereiniteitskwessie aan te 
spreek nie omdat post-apartheid wetgewing die herstel van grondregte magtig. 
Die appélbeslissings in Richtersveld en Popela erken dat sekere gebruiksregte 
die koloniale ontneming van eiendom oorleef het. Die oorblywende gebruiksregte 
is later ‘n tweede keer ontneem as gevolg van apartheid. Deur gebruikmaking 
van hierdie konstruksie, wat dieselfde logika volg as die leerstuk van 
inheemsregtelike regte en berus op  fragmentasie van eiendomsaansprake, kan 
gesê word dat die tweede ontneming van grond wel binne die 1913-afsnydatum 
 val. Gevolglik sal alle historiese restitusie-eise nie noodwendig deur die 1913-
afsnydatum uitgesluit word nie. Dit is steeds moontlik dat sommige pre-1913 
ontnemings nooit onder die vaandel van die Richtersveld- en Popela-beslissings 
gebring sal kan word nie, en die vraag of histories gebaseerde eise moontlik is 
ongeag die 1913-afsnydatum sal daarom weer opduik, veral indien die 
grondeisers nie geakkommodeer word in die grondherverdelingsprogram van die 
staat nie. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Given South Africa’s history of both colonial and apartheid land dispossessions, 
land reform understandably became a major transformation and development 
objective of the African National Congress (ANC) government soon after coming 
into power in 1994. The White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP),1 which was adopted in September 1994, set out the 
principles guiding the land reform policy and programme. These guiding 
principles culminated with the Department of Land Affairs issuing the 1997 White 
Paper on South African Land Policy (White Paper),2 which recognised land 
redistribution, land restitution and land tenure reform as being the three elements 
of the land reform programme. Whereas tenure reform was aimed at reinforcing 
weak land rights and redistribution focused on providing wider and more 
equitable access to land in general, the restitution process was specifically 
designed for a limited purpose, namely to restore land (or give other equitable 
redress) to people from whom it had been taken away as part of apartheid 
racially-based legislation or policies. 
                                                        
1
 Republic of South Africa, Government of National Unity White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (1994) at 2.4.1 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/rdpwhite.html 
[accessed 12 August 2009]. 
2
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) at 2.3. 
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After much debate, a property clause was eventually included in the post-
apartheid Constitution.3 Both the 1993 and the 1996 Constitution made provision 
for land reform, which included restitution, although this provision was only 
included within the property clause in the 1996 Constitution.4 The purpose of land 
restitution, according to the White Paper on South African Land Policy, is to 
restore land and to provide further restitution remedies to people dispossessed 
by racially discriminatory laws and practices. One of the most significant 
characteristics of the restitution process, for present purposes, is that the 
Constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act5 authorised and regulates the 
process of restitution subject to a historical cut-off date, with the effect that 
restitution claims are possible only for land dispossessions that occurred after 
that date. The preamble to the Restitution of Land Rights Act provides that the 
Act is intended to “[p]romote the protection and advancement of persons, groups 
or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to 
promote their full and equal enjoyment of rights in land.” In terms of the Act, a 
community or individual dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of racially discriminatory laws or practices may lodge a claim for restitution. 
The form of redress is wide ranging and it includes either compensation or 
restitution of the dispossessed right or other equitable redress. The Act defines 
                                                        
3
 Budlender G “The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: An Overview” in Budlender G, 
Latsky J & Roux T (eds) Juta’s New Land Law (1998) at 1-5. 
4
 S 25(7). In the 1993 Constitution land restitution was provided for in the land reform provisions 
in ss 121-123, which did not form part of the Bill of Rights. 
5
 22 of 1994. 
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the rights and interests that had been dispossessed and that can be restored 
widely, recognising both registered and unregistered rights. 
 
The policy framework document adopted by the new government, the White 
Paper on South African Land Policy, first set the cut-off date for restitution claims 
at 1913. The Interim Constitution of 1993 made provision for land restitution for 
individuals and communities dispossessed of land. In addition, the Constitution 
provided that an enabling Act of Parliament was to be promulgated to govern the 
restitution of land rights.6 This was the basis for the adoption of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. This Act stipulates that a person (or a direct 
descendant of such a person) who was dispossessed of a right in land after 19 
June 1913, under an abolished racially discriminatory law or practice, may qualify 
as a claimant for the restitution of rights in land.7 The property clause8 in the Final 
Constitution of 1996 contains a similar provision that maintains the cut-off date 
for unfair dispossession of land rights as 19 June 1913. In addition, the land 
claim must have been lodged by 31 December 1998. The restitution process is 
therefore restricted by a cut-off date that excludes dispossessions that took place 
before 19 June 1913, as well as by a sunset clause that excludes claims that 
have not been lodged by 31 December 1998.  
 
It is generally accepted that the cut-off date is a feature that reflects the 
                                                        
6
 Ss 121-123 of the 1993 Constitution. 
7
 S 2(3). 
8
 S 25. 
  
 
4 
compromise nature of the Constitution.9 It is an attempt at finding the balance 
between the rights of those dispossessed and the rights of the current occupiers. 
Although the Act recognises the legitimacy of restitution claims for unjust land 
dispossessions that took place prior to the democratic turnaround of 1994, it is 
acknowledged that certain historical dispossessions and injustices cannot be 
restored by means of this process. In view of the White Paper, the Constitution 
and the Act, the cut-off date of 1913 was identified as the historical point that 
signifies the break between historical injustices that have to be restored and 
those that cannot be restored through the restitution process, although those 
affected by them could be accommodated in other land reform programmes, 
such as the land redistribution programmes. 
 
In summing up the reactions to the cut-off date, essentially, the Minister of Land 
Affairs and some authors view the cut-off date’s exclusion of further claims for 
pre-1913 dispossessions as fair, pragmatic and logical. The majority of political 
and academic commentators seem to accept that it is the result of a pragmatic 
decision that allows the major apartheid dispossessions to be rectified, albeit at 
the cost of other, equally racially determined, pre-apartheid dispossessions. 
Political opinion seems to have been shaped by pragmatic considerations 
emerging from the deals that were struck during the multi-party negotiations. 
However, some commentators see the cut-off date as unfair and think that 
obvious pre-1913 dispossessions should be restored, despite the cut-off date. 
                                                        
9
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs Green Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1996) 2.12. 
  
 
5 
Others venture that the doctrine of aboriginal title can be used for that purpose, 
given that the Constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act appear to 
preclude pre-1913 land claims. Academic opinion remained largely unclear as to 
whether the effect of the 1913 cut-off date is absolute or whether the courts 
should consider claims based on dispossessions that occurred prior to the cut-off 
date anyway, although the majority of commentators seemed to favour the view 
that the seemingly unambiguous language of the Act precluded the possibility of 
allowing historical land claims to restore land to people who had been 
dispossessed of it prior to the cut-off date. This was the position that the courts 
found themselves in when the first restitution claims surfaced.  
 
A preliminary point that deserves mention here is the fact that, essentially, all 
restitution claims are historical, in the sense that they entail a claim for restitution 
based on a dispossession that took place in the past and that should, in terms of 
new policy, now be overturned. In this perspective, the restitution claims for post-
1913 dispossessions that are allowed under the Act are also historically based 
claims. However, for purposes of brevity the phrase ‘historical land claims’ is 
used here to refer to claims that are apparently excluded from the restitution 
process under the Act because they are based on pre-1913 dispossessions. 
 
Hence, having stated the problem – namely that the 1913 cut-off date appears to 
exclude historically based land claims – the question to be asked is: just how far 
can the courts go in interpreting the cut-off date in order to include historically 
  
 
6 
based land claims? Is it possible that dispossessions that took place prior to 
1913 could nevertheless be adjudicated within the framework of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Acts, or is it possible that historical land claims could be considered 
outside of the Act? In seeking answers to this question, resort will be had to two 
sources. The first source is comparative law, namely the jurisprudence arising 
out of aboriginal land rights decisions in Australia and Canada. The leading 
cases on land restitution from these jurisdictions will be analysed so as to 
establish whether the methodology by which historically based land claims were 
decided in these jurisdictions could also be brought to bear within or outside of 
the framework of the South African Restitution of Land Rights Act, 
notwithstanding the cut-off date. The second source to be considered is South 
African case law on the restitution process, to determine whether historical land 
claims could (and should) be considered within or outside of the framework 
established by the Restitution of Land Rights Acts. 
 
The question to be answered in analysing both these sources is whether it is 
possible, in South African law, and particularly given the framework established 
by the Restitution of Land Rights Acts and the 1913 cut-off date, to consider 
restitution claims that are based on land dispossessions that took place prior to 
the statutory cut-off date of 1913, or whether claims of this nature are excluded 
automatically by the cut-off date. Secondly, if it is possible to consider such 
claims, the further question is to establish what the optimal theoretical or 
doctrinal foundation for adjudication of these claims is. 
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1.2. Research Question, Hypothesis and Methodology 
The main question to be asked is whether the cut-off date excludes all claims 
that originate in land dispossessions that took place before 1913. As previously 
mentioned, most colonial dispossessions of land took place before 1913. In fact, 
it has been said that by 1913, the larger dispossessions under colonialism 
(compared to apartheid) had already been carried out, hence creating the 
importance of including pre-1913 dispossessions. When first faced with land 
claims where the original dispossession of the full ownership right had taken 
place before 1913, the courts dismissed the land claims out of hand on the basis 
that they failed to fulfil the requirements of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. 
This failure to satisfy the requirements in the Act is either ascribed to the fact that 
the dispossession took place prior to the cut-off date, or it results from the fact 
that a use right that survived the pre-1913 dispossession was scaled down or 
hollowed out to an extent where it, having been subjected to a second, post-1913 
dispossession under apartheid laws, no longer satisfies the requirements of the 
Act. Since the courts appeared to disregard historically based land claims in 
terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, the question is asked whether it is 
possible to have a historically based land claim succeed on the basis of 
aboriginal title, or whether it is possible to adjudicate these claims in terms of a 
different interpretation of the Act. 
 
The hypothesis upon which this thesis proceeds is that South African law does 
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not need the doctrine of aboriginal title, to the extent that the formulation of 
restitution claims in the Richtersveld10 and Popela11 decisions, which is not unlike 
the logic of the Canadian and Australian Delgamuukw and Mabo cases, applies. 
The underlying assumption is that the 1913 cut-off does not, as it may seem to 
do, exclude historically based land claims absolutely, provided that a limited use 
right survived the initial colonial dispossession and was again subjected to a 
second, post-1913 dispossession under the apartheid laws. A further assumption 
is that the constitutionally mandated Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 
should be given a wide or purposive interpretation to enable the courts to provide 
redress for individuals and groups that have been the victims of both colonial and 
apartheid land dispossessions. If the Act is interpreted purposively, it should be 
possible to apply the processes foreseen in the Act in a way that would include, 
rather than exclude, at least some dispossessions that started prior to the 1913 
cut-off date but that continued to affect the position of the occupiers long after the 
cut-off date. In this logic, the initial, colonial dispossession would not destroy 
original land rights completely but leaves a limited use right in the hands of the 
original owners or occupiers. If they were subjected to a second dispossession 
under apartheid laws, the focus of the restitution claim could, for purposes of the 
cut-off date, fall on the second, apartheid dispossession, but the restitution order 
could take into account the whole history of dispossession from colonial times. 
 
                                                        
10
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC). 
11
 Department of Land Affairs and Others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 
199 (CC). 
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The formulation in the successful appeal decisions of Richtersveld and Popela 
succeeded in formulating such a purposive approach by following a specific logic. 
First of all, the courts identified a weaker remaining right of use or of occupation 
that survived the original, colonial dispossession of full ownership. This weaker 
interest is then described as the subject of a second dispossession that took 
place under apartheid, after the cut-off date. By concentrating on the weaker 
surviving right, the courts able to consider a restitution claim under the Act; by 
concentrating on the colonial as well as the apartheid dispossessions the courts 
can craft a restitution order that might grant a right of full ownership over the 
subject land, which in effect restores to the claimants the same ownership 
previously dispossessed under colonialism.  
 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act stipulates that there must be an interest or a 
surviving right in land as on 19 June 1913, which interest is dispossessed under 
a racially discriminatory law or practice. The appeal decisions of Richtersveld and 
Popela considered that both communities had been dispossessed, prior to 1913, 
of the original right of ownership and that lesser rights in the land remained. For 
the Richtersveld people, the lesser right was in the form of use rights since the 
community was permitted, after the Crown annexed their land in 1847, to 
continue residing on the land. The use rights included habitation, hunting and 
drawing water. The community was only made to leave the subject land in 1925, 
after the discovery of diamonds on the subject land. The court found that the 
community’s use right, which the Constitutional Court characterised as a 
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customary law interest, survived the 1913 cut-off date and therefore the claim 
succeeded. The restitution award was full ownership of the subject land, which is 
a stronger right than the actual use right that was dispossessed under apartheid, 
but reflected the right that the community enjoyed prior to the first, colonial 
dispossession. The Popela community was also dispossessed of their original 
ownership in 1889 and thereafter forced to become labour tenants in order to 
remain on the land. In 1969, their remaining labour tenancy rights were revoked 
and replaced by wage labour. They therefore lodged a restitution claim. The 
Constitutional Court found that the surviving right of labour tenancy was 
dispossessed after 1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws. Here too, the 
court took into account the lesser surviving right to satisfy the 1913 cut-off date, 
but awarded a stronger right of full ownership, such as the community previously 
enjoyed. 
 
The formulation of the Australian Mabo12 and Canadian Delgamuukw13 cases on 
aboriginal title distinguishes loss of sovereignty from loss of title to land. 
Aboriginal title is said to continue existing, after colonisation, as a burden on the 
Crown’s underlying radical title. Using this formulation, full ownership to the land 
was restored to the community on the basis of the doctrine of aboriginal title. In 
Mabo, the Mer people from the Murray Islands challenged the actions of the 
federal government when the government attempted to place heavy restrictions 
on their land use. Eventually, after protracted litigation, the Australian High Court 
                                                        
12
 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
13
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) DLR (4th) 193, 
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ruled in favour of the Merriam people and restored rights of full ownership based 
on the doctrine of aboriginal title. In Delgamuukw, although not deciding on the 
land claim, the Supreme Court of Canada gave a detailed discussion on the 
nature, source and content of the doctrine of aboriginal title. In order to by-pass 
the issue of sovereignty, Australian and Canadian courts have developed the 
doctrine of aboriginal title in order to allow them to restore land that was 
dispossessed at the time that the British Crown established territorial 
sovereignty. Broadly framed, the doctrine of aboriginal title maintains that 
indigenous communities retained an indigenous law title in their respective lands 
when their sovereignty was lost as a result of colonisation, which title then acts 
as a burden on the underlying Crown’s radical title to the newly acquired 
territories. 
 
This distinction between loss of sovereignty and loss of title is not unlike the 
distinction between loss of title as a result of colonisation and loss of surviving 
rights as a result of apartheid in the appeal decisions of the Richtersveld and 
Popela land claims cases. Using this formulation allowed the Australian and 
Canadian courts to consider restitution claims in the absence of legislation; within 
the South African context it allowed the courts to conclude that historically based 
land claims are not necessarily automatically excluded by the 1913 cut-off date. 
 
Reliance will be placed on several methodologies to cover the issues set out 
above. The first method is an analysis of the Act in order to consider its 
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requirements for a successful land claim, and particularly the cut-off date. South 
African case law will be analysed to discover how the South African courts dealt 
with the cut-off date and with the requirements for a restitution claim. The 
comparative case law is analysed to find out how the doctrine of aboriginal title 
was construed by the Australian and Canadian courts and whether it can be 
applied in South Africa. Finally, doctrinal analysis will be used to show the nature 
and effect of the Richtersveld and Popela cases on the consideration of the 
dispossessions and on the restitution orders. 
 
1.3 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 discusses the 1913 cut-off date, noting that it is a compromise feature 
in the aftermath of the negotiations leading to the birth of the democratic state by 
South African political parties. The cut-off date parallels the date on which the 
Black Land Act 1913 was promulgated. The 1913 Act is said to have been the 
precursor to further racially based legislation that eventually saw the black South 
African population occupying just 13% percent of the land even though they 
constituted 80% of the population.  
 
Chapter 2 also shows how the new democratic government developed and 
implemented the land reform programme to redress the injustices of apartheid 
land dispossessions. Land restitution, as governed by the constitutionally 
mandated Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, is the key tool for the 
restoration of previously dispossessed rights in land. It provides restitution of land 
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or other equitable redress where the dispossession took place after 19 June 
1913 in the furtherance of a racially discriminatory law or practice. Opinion is 
divided as to the justification and desirability of the cut-off date. Chapter 2 further 
discusses the reaction of political and academic commentators on the 
justification of the cut-off date and the reaction of the lower courts when 
adjudicating claims where the original dispossession took place before the cut-off 
date. The decisions seemed to imply that historically based land claims are 
precluded from the restitution process. 
 
Chapter 3 then follows up on the implication that historically based land claims 
are left out of the restitution process and considers the doctrine of aboriginal title 
in Australia and Canada as a possible means of getting around the 1913 cut-off 
date. The chapter notes how, in these jurisdictions, the land reform process has 
been chiefly driven by the courts rather than by political will, in the sense that 
there is no comprehensive legislative basis for restitution claims. As such, their 
land claims process, not being governed by legislation, does not have a cut-off 
date.  
 
Chapter 3 further shows how, in fashioning a remedy for colonial land 
dispossessions, Canadian and Australian courts were constrained by the 
problem of the Crown’s sovereignty. The underlying assumption is that the 
Crown, in establishing title during colonisation, extinguished all prior existing titles 
to land. Since the Crown established both sovereignty and title over the land 
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upon colonisation, the courts were confronted with the problem that they could 
not reverse the effects of colonisation without interfering with sovereignty. 
Relying on the groundbreaking Mabo and Delgamuukw decisions, which 
distinguished between loss of sovereignty and loss of title to land, the Australian 
and Canadian courts were able to craft the doctrine of aboriginal title as a 
remedy which allows for restitution claims by identifying a surviving and thus 
restorable aboriginal land right that acts as a burden on the underlying Crown 
title. This formulation is not unlike that used by Richtersvld and Popela in the 
appeal decisions. 
 
Chapter 4 then discusses the Richtersveld and Popela decisions in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. It will be shown that the decisions 
reflect a formulation which identifies a right – either in the form of a use right or a 
right of occupancy – that survived the original dispossession. The surviving 
weaker right was then dispossessed again, under apartheid laws. The courts 
were able, on the basis of the surviving right, to grant restitution of the full 
ownership dispossessed before the 1913 cut of date. This logic, like the Mabo 
and Delgamuukw cases, identifies a weaker surviving right, and on that basis 
awards restitution of full ownership. Chapter 4 will also discuss alternative 
approaches to the Richtersveld and Popela formulation of historical 
dispossessions, including the question whether the doctrine of aboriginal title 
should or can be applied in South African law at all. The chapter, mindful of the 
temporal nature of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, will also offer opinion as to 
  
 
15 
whether historically based land claims outside of the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act are plausible. 
 
The concluding chapter 5 summarises the above conclusions and answers the 
question as to just how the courts can interpret the cut-off date to include 
historically based land claims. 
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2 
 
The 1913 Cut-Off Date and its Implications 
 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Background to Land Dispossessions in South Africa 
This chapter discusses the land restitution programme in South Africa, noting 
that there is a cut-off date for land restitution claims. The Constitution14 limits land 
restitution to dispossessions that occurred after 19 June 1913 and as a result of 
racially discriminatory laws or practices. The Restitution of Land Rights Act15 is 
the principal legislative tool governing the land restitution process and it carries 
the same stipulation. Hence it appears that the Restitution of Land Rights Act 
precludes pre-1913 land dispossessions. Various reasons are cited for this date, 
the most obvious being that the cut-off date reflects the date on which the 
infamous Native Land Act16 came into effect. 
 
On the other hand, Canada and Australia, both of which have also in recent 
times restored land seized under colonialism to their indigenous populations, do 
not have a statutory limit on the date of dispossession. In fact, neither of these 
                                                        
14
 S 25(7) states that “[a] person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by an Act 
of Parliament either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.” 
15
 22 of 1994. 
16
 27 of 1913.  
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countries has promulgated comprehensive restitution legislation. Instead, their 
courts have formulated the doctrine of aboriginal title as a means to restore 
colonial land dispossessions.  
 
Arguably, the doctrine of aboriginal title is rendered unnecessary in South Africa 
by the Restitution of Land Rights Act, at least to the extent that the Act makes it 
unnecessary for the courts to invent a legal basis for restitution claims. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the Act imposes a limit in the form of a cut-off date, at 
face value, precludes some historically based land claims in South Africa. Thus 
this formal limit must be considered in light of the deliberate democratic 
processes from which it arose. 
 
South African history is long steeped in land dispossessions.17 The San and 
KhoiKhoi were the first people to be dispossessed of their traditional land and 
thereafter numerous wars were fought over land control. The arrival of European 
settlers saw the continuance of land-based conflicts.18 Colonial powers declared 
land traditionally occupied and controlled by various indigenous groups as 
“Crown” land and later as “state” land. In so doing, pre-existing traditional forms 
of land ownership were either not recognised or destroyed within the new 
settlers’ legal system.19 Segregation based on race became entrenched in South 
                                                        
17
 Bundy C “Land, Law and Power: Forced Removals in Historical Context” in Murray C & 
O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest: Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 3-11 at 
4. 
18
 Terreblanche S A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 (2002) at 9-10. 
19
 Terreblanche S A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 (2002) at 9-10. 
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Africa long before the National Party (NP) took power in 1948. This segregation 
had a direct link to the manner in which occupation of, access to and rights on 
land were regulated.  
 
Land legislation was the primary tool used to achieve territorial segregation. Prior 
to 1913 many land laws had been enacted in the British colonies and the Boer 
Republics to control squatting and to regulate tenancies, complete with penalties 
and punishments for contraventions.20 The Black Land Act21 that came into effect 
on 19 June 1913 carried similar provisions but was more severe. It provided for 
scheduled areas where only black persons could reside on specific land. Also, 
they were precluded from residing on land outside the scheduled areas. As many 
as three million black people had to leave their ancestral lands to settle in low 
quality land in the scheduled areas.22 Apart from being restricted to the 
scheduled areas, black people also lost the right to purchase land in these areas, 
with the result that they acquired inferior and weak land rights even in the areas 
they were restricted to. The Act was what Bundy23 describes as an effort to 
destroy independent forms of tenure and to create and sustain a perpetual state 
of dependent tenancy. 
                                                        
20
 Bundy C “Land, Law and Power: Forced Removals in Historical Context” in Murray C & 
O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest: Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 3-11 at 
5. 
21
 27 of 1913. 
22
 Terreblanche S A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 (2002) at 260-263. 
23
 Bundy C “Land, Law and Power: Forced Removals in Historical Context” in Murray C & 
O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest: Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 3-11 at 
4. 
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After that, the South African Development and Trust Land Act24 was 
promulgated, in terms of which released areas were created exclusively for black 
occupation. Black people lost the right to own, rent or share-crop land outside the 
designated areas. This Act eventually saw the allocation of a mere 13% of the 
country to black people, even though they comprised 80% of the population. 
 
These land acts were followed by other developments, which included the Group 
Areas Act25 and later the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act,26 which made 
provision for four independent national states27 and six self-governing 
territories.28 The Group Areas Act created different residential and business 
areas based on racial grouping within urban areas. Non-whites were excluded 
from living in the most developed areas and were forcibly removed after being 
deemed to be resident in the wrong area. The Promotion of Bantu Self Governing 
Act divided black South Africans into distinct ethnic groups and sought to 
transform reserves into independent homelands. It further banned parliamentary 
representation for black South Africans. 
 
2.1.2 Land Reform 
Under intense international political pressure and a weakening economy, the 
                                                        
24
 18 of 1936. 
25
 41 of 1950. 
26
 46 of 1959. 
27
 The erstwhile so-called homelands: Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Boputhatswana. 
28
 Kwa-Ndebele, Qwa-Qwa, ka-Ngwane, Kwa-Zulu, Gazankulu and Lebowa. 
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National Party adopted the White Paper on Land Reform in 1991.29 It aimed to 
increase access to land rights to the entire population, upgrade the quality and 
security of title in land as well as to utilise land as a resource available to all. 
Three key pieces of legislation were passed in order to fulfil the latter 
objectives.30 The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act31 was intended 
to deracialise the land control system. It repealed various pieces of primary 
legislation on which the policy of spatial separation of different racial groupings in 
South Africa was based. It either wholly or partially repealed the racially based 
land laws. Positive action by the state in the form of a robust programme to fully 
engage the inequality in respect of landholding and access to land, insecure 
tenure, and land restitution was sorely needed. The Upgrading of Land Tenure 
Rights Act32 was intended to elevate informal land rights and permits to occupy 
into full ownership. The Less Formal Township Establishment Act33 envisaged 
the creation of townships by black South Africans, for their exclusive use in terms 
of a communal system. Equally important was the fact that the Act made it 
possible for tribal authorities to establish a township and to dispose of land after 
permission was granted by the provincial authorities. 
                                                        
29
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on Land Reform WPB-91 
(1991) http://land.pwv.gov.za/White%20Paper/white4.htm [accessed 12 August 2009]. In general, 
for detailed background on the negotiations that took place during the transition period, see 
Terreblance S A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 (2002), particularly at 306-311. 
30
 The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, Upgrading of Land Tenure 
Rights Act 112 of 1991 and the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991.  
31
 108 of 1991. 
32
 112 of 1991. 
33
 113 of 1991. 
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It is no surprise, therefore, that land reform was a major objective of the African 
National Congress (ANC) government soon after coming into power in 1994. The 
White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),34 
adopted in September 1994, set out the principles guiding the land reform policy 
and programme. These guiding principles culminated with the Department of 
Land Affairs issuing the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy (White 
Paper),35 which recognised land redistribution, land restitution and land tenure 
reform as being the three elements of the land reform programme. The advent of 
the new constitutional dispensation ultimately saw the inclusion, after much 
debate, of a property clause in the national constitution.36 Both the 1993 and the 
1996 Constitutions included provision for land reform, and particularly restitution, 
                                                        
34
 Republic of South Africa, Government of National Unity White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (1994) at 2.4.1 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/rdpwhite.html 
[accessed 12 August 2009]. 
35
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) at 2.3. 
36
 The constitutional protection of property was controversial from the onset and was one of the 
last issues to be resolved in the negotiations for a constitution to found the new democratic 
dispensation. It was argued that the entrenching of the property clause would legitimise the 
consequences of apartheid and land dispossessions. In fact, some authors remain unconvinced 
as to its constitutionally protected status. See for example Hendricks F “Does the South African 
Constitution Legitimise Colonial Land Alienation?” (2004) (Paper presented to the Sociology 
Department seminar series, Rand Afrikaans University) available at 
http://general.rau.ac.za/sociology/Hendricks.pdf [accessed 30 October 2008]. He asks whether 
the South African Constitution justifies colonial land theft. For a general discussion on the debate 
over the constitutional entrenchment of property rights, see Budlender G “The Constitutional 
Protection of Property Rights: An Overview” in Budlender G, Latsky J & Roux T (eds) Juta’s New 
Land Law (1998) at 1-5. 
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albeit that this provision was only included in the property clause in the 1996 
Constitution.37 
 
The policy framework document adopted by the new government first set the cut-
off date for restitution claims as 1913.38 The purpose of land restitution, 
according to the White Paper on South African Land Policy, is to restore land and 
to provide further restitution remedies to people dispossessed by racially 
discriminatory laws and practices. The restoration of land provides support to the 
overarching national process of reconstruction, reconciliation and development. 
Walker describes the master narrative underpinning the South African land 
reform process as being composed of two themes, namely “[t]he trauma of deep 
dislocating loss of land in the past and the promise of restorative justice through 
the return of that land in the future.”39 The 1913 cut-off date reflects the above 
considerations, as the discussion below details. 
 
2.2 The 19 June 1913 Cut-Off Date 
The Interim Constitution of 1993 made provision for land restitution for individuals 
and communities dispossessed of land. In addition, an enabling Act of Parliament 
                                                        
37
 S 25(7). In the 1993 Constitution land restitution was provided for in the land reform provisions 
in ss 121-123, which did not form part of the Bill of Rights. 
38
 The Reconstruction and Devolvement Programme (1994) states that land restitution is “[t]o 
redress the suffering caused by the policy of forced removals, the democratic government must, 
through the mechanism of a land claims court, restore land to South Africa’s dispossessed by 
discriminatory legislation since 1913.”  
39
 Walker C Land Marked: Land Claims and Restitution in South Africa (2008) at 34. 
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was to govern the restitution of land rights.40 This was the basis for the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. This Act stipulates that a person (or a 
direct descendant of such a person) who was dispossessed of a right in land 
after 19 June 1913, under an abolished racially discriminatory law, may qualify as 
a claimant for the restitution of rights in land.41 The property clause42 in the Final 
Constitution of 1996 contains a similar provision that maintains the cut-off date 
for unfair dispossession of land rights as 19 June 1913.  
 
It is generally accepted that the cut-off date is a feature that reflects the 
compromise nature of the Constitution.43 It is an attempt at finding the balance 
between the rights of those dispossessed and the rights of the current 
occupiers.44 The Green Paper acknowledges that certain restitution claims will 
fall outside of the Restitution of Land Rights Act because of the cut-off date’s 
limitation to dispossessions that occurred after 19 June 1913.45 In such cases, a 
commitment is made to provide alternative forms of relief, although these 
alternatives are not explained. The Green Paper states that the restitution 
                                                        
40
 Ss 121-123 of the 1993 Constitution. 
41
 S 2(3). 
42
  S 25. 
43
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs Green Paper on South African Land 
Policy (1996) 2.12. 
44
 Van der Walt AJ “Land Reform in South Africa Since 1990 – An Overview” (1995) 10 SAPL 1-
30 at 4. Van der Walt states that this balance should be seen against the background of the 
“[s]uffering, injustice and poverty created by an enormous and ill-advised programme of social 
engineering carried out by white nationalist governments over a period of forty years.” 
45
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs Green Paper on South African Land 
Policy (1996) 2.12. 
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process as set out in the Constitution would be unworkable if it applied to all 
historic land claims, concluding that in South Africa ancestral land claims would 
be problematic since the legal and political complexities associated with such 
claims would be too difficult to solve.46 The White Paper justifies the exclusion of 
pre-1913 land claims on the basis that most historic claims are by their nature 
based on tribal affiliation, and that such claims would “serve to awaken and/or 
prolong destructive ethnic and racial politics.”47 Moreover, the demographics of 
ethnically defined communities have changed over the years with populations 
growing to more than eight times that of the past. There would also be a risk of 
overlapping claims in instances where land was occupied in succession by 
various ethnic groups.48 
 
In public hearings49 before the Portfolio Committee on Agricultural and Land 
Affairs, aimed at amending certain provisions of the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act, the Chief Land Claims Commissioner stated that pre-1913 land 
dispossessions were fuelled by colonial and tribal wars, implying that such claims 
are not the result of racially discriminatory laws or practices as envisaged by the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act. Furthermore, he stated that such claims would 
                                                        
46
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs Green Paper on South African Land 
Policy (1996) 2.12. 
47
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) 3.17.3. 
48Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) 3.17.3. 
49
 www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/comreports/050308pcagricreport.htm [accessed on 11 October 
2008). 
  
 
25 
lead to inter-tribal wars, and that the largest claims would be only for restitution of 
land originally occupied by the KhoiSan population. 
 
The 2005 Land Summit50 mooted the possibility of revisiting the cut-off date to 
either 1652 or 1820, when the Dutch and English settlers respectively arrived. 
This was dismissed by the then Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko 
Didiza, on the grounds that this would open up a Pandora’s Box of “counter plans 
over counter plans”. She added that all issues pertaining to land needs were 
addressed by the land redistribution programme as well as land tenure 
legislation.  
 
Carey Miller and Pope51 have described the limitation of restitution claims to 
post-1913 dispossession as a critical aspect of the restitution process. They sum 
up the reasoning of the White Paper’s insistence on the cut-off date as follows: 
firstly, aboriginal title should not be included in the South African restitutionary 
process as South Africa differs demographically from the countries in which it has 
been applied successfully.52 Secondly, aboriginal title is unsuitable in land claims 
as there has been a shift in the ownership paradigm from that of long ago and 
also, some land settled on by European settlers was terra nullius.53 Finally, due 
                                                        
50
 www.land.pwv.gov.za/Land_Summit/ [accessed on 11 October 2008). 
51
 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) 315. 
52
 Namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America. 
53
 On this point, Yanou scathingly comments that “[i]t reflects the tendency to devise exculpatory 
reminiscences by those who having unjustly enriched themselves with African lands seek to 
frustrate its restoration”: Yanou MA “The 1913 Cut-Off Date for Restitution of Dispossessed Land 
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to the ethnic nature of aboriginal title, it was felt that this may influence ethnic 
conflicts over land. Carey Miller and Pope regard the cut-off date as valuable in 
the land restitution process because it ensures that potential claimants can be 
identified with sufficient certainty. They add that it is essential to balance prime 
concerns such as restitution with maintaining public confidence in the land 
market. Since forced removals are a phenomenon of the twentieth century, the 
twentieth century cut-off date is consistent with that limitation. They suggest that 
this limitation could have a positive influence on the economy. This would be in 
line with the stated objectives of the White Paper.54 Their conclusion is that, 
ultimately, the 1913 cut-off date makes the scope of restitution clear.  
 
Patterson55 describes the cut-off date as a realistic compromise, adding that the 
Land Claims Court cannot be reasonably expected to deal with 350 years of land 
dispossessions. Walker56 describes the cut-off date as “pragmatic” yet “not 
unprincipled” and adds that the history of pre-1913 dispossessions is too dense 
to fall in line with community-level redress as envisaged in the post- 1994 land 
restitution programme. Walker further opines that the poverty and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in South Africa: A Critical Appraisal” (2006) 41 Africa Development 177-188 at 179. 
54
 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) 2.2.5. The White Paper states that one of the indicators of the land reform programme is 
achieving land restitution whilst maintaining public confidence in the land market. 
55
 Patterson S “Land Restitution and the Prospects of Aboriginal Title in South Africa” (2003) 34 
Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 13-28 at 15. 
56
 Walker C “Redistributive Land Reform; For What and for Whom?” in Nstebeza L & Hall R (eds) 
The Land Question in South Africa – The Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution (2007) 
132-151 at 136. 
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underdevelopment brought about by colonial land dispossessions can be 
alleviated through alternative development strategies, although she does not 
describe the alternative strategies in any detail. 
 
Visser and Roux57 note that the 1913 cut-off date is a compromise feature of the 
land reform programme. They state that this compromise is due to the realisation 
that the foundations of apartheid were laid long before the National Party came 
into power in 1948. This in effect precludes the inclusion of pre- 1913 colonial era 
dispossessions in the restitution programme. They argue that pre-1913 claims 
would be too complicated to solve, given the massive population migrations 
involved, the absence of written records and the passage of time. Also, the ANC 
was particularly concerned that pre-1913 claims would be used by the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) to lay a claim, based on ethnicity, to the entire province of 
KwaZulu-Natal.58 
 
Roux59 states that even though land dispossessions took place before 1913, the 
bulk of the country’s usable land had been occupied by European settlers during 
the course of the 19th century. The cut-off date is testimony to the delicate 
balance of power at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
                                                        
57
 Visser D & Roux T “Giving Back the Country: South Africa’s Restitution of Land Rights Act 
1994 in Context” in Rwelamira MR & Werle G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices: Approaches to 
Amnesty, Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South African and Germany (1996) 89-111 
at 94. 
58
 Carey Miller DL & Pope A Land Title in South Africa (2000) at 315. 
59
 Roux T “The Restitution of Land Rights Act” in Budlender G, Latsky J & Roux T (eds) Juta’s 
New Land Law (1998) at 3A-4. 
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talks.60 Roux acknowledges the arbitrariness of the cut-off date, but suggests that 
it would be theoretically possible for communities dispossessed of land before 
1913 to claim restitution on the basis of the doctrine of aboriginal title; he even 
suggests that there may be some tactical advantage in using this doctrine in 
support of a general claim for state assistance.61 
 
Budlender62 notes the compromise reached by political parties in the drafting of 
the property clause in the interim Constitution. As an indicator of the significance 
of land, he notes that of all the wrongs caused by apartheid and racial 
discrimination, it is only the dispossession of land rights which the interim 
Constitution specifically directed the legislature to rectify. Bennett and Powell63 
point out that the Restitution of Land Rights Act is of limited effect in that the 
restitution mechanism is primarily aimed at redressing the wrongs of apartheid, of 
which land deprivation is the most immediate injustice. 
 
The apparently broad consensus64 about the wisdom of the 1913 cut-off date 
                                                        
60The series of multi-party negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa. They took place between 
1990 and 1993 and resulted in South Africa’s first multiracial election in 1994.  
61Roux T “The Restitution of Land Rights Act” in Budlender G, Latsky J & Roux T (eds) Juta’s 
New Land Law (1998) at 3A-4. 
62
 Budlender G “The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary” in 
Budlender G, Latsky J & Roux T (eds) Juta’s New Land Law (1998) at 1-3. 
63
 Bennett TW & Powell CH “Aboriginal Title in South Africa Revisited” (2005) 19 SAJHR 449- 
485 at 450. 
64
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) at 293-294 states that a clear result of the 
1913 cut-off date is that historically based land claims against colonial dispossessions are, 
somewhat controversially, left out of the restitution process. 
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does not completely exclude the relevance of the doctrine of aboriginal title from 
the scope of the South African restitution process. Bennett and Powell65 submit 
that some aboriginal title restitution claims can be legitimate in South African law. 
Reilly66 similarly opines that international law jurisprudence provides enough 
reason for South African law to recognise the applicability of aboriginal title 
claims. Yanou67 describes the cut-off date as unreasonable in light of the 
corrective justice theory that underpins the land restitution process. He submits 
that where land dispossessions that occurred before 1913 are clearly identifiable, 
then it is “[t]heoretically unsound to foreclose it by an arbitrary limitation of time 
provision.”  
 
In summing up the reactions to the cut-off date, essentially, the Minister of Land 
Affairs and some authors view the cut-off date’s exclusion of further claims for 
pre-1913 dispossessions as fair, pragmatic and logical. Some see it as unfair and 
think that obvious pre-1913 dispossessions should be restored, despite the cut-
off date. Others venture that the doctrine of aboriginal title can be used for that 
purpose. 
 
2.3 Judicial Reactions to the Cut-Off Date 
                                                        
65
 Bennett TW & Powell CH “Aboriginal Title in South Africa Revisited” (2005) 19 SAJHR 449- 
485 481. 
66
 Reilley A “The Australian Experience of Aboriginal Title: Lessons for South Africa” (2000) 16 
SAJHR 512-534 at 528. 
67
 Yanou MA “The 1913 Cut-Off Date for Restitution of Dispossessed Land in South Africa: A 
Critical Appraisal” (2006) 41 Africa Development 177-188 at 180. 
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2.3.1 Introduction 
The Constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act appear to preclude pre-
1913 land claims. Academic opinion, as discussed above, remained largely 
unclear as to whether the effect of the 1913 cut-off date is absolute or whether 
the courts should consider claims based on dispossessions that occurred prior to 
the cut-off date anyway. This was the position that the courts found themselves 
in. Their approach to the problem is discussed below.   
 
2.3.2 The Richtersveld Land Claim68 
The subject land had been inhabited by the San and the Khoi Khoi since time 
immemorial. In this time, they had treated the subject land as theirs, with 
outsiders having to obtain permission to either graze or use the land and its 
minerals. This right in the land was said to be rooted in the traditional laws and 
customs of the inhabitants.69 
 
Upon annexation by the British Crown in 1847, the Cape Colonial government 
considered the subject land to be Crown land.70 However, the inhabitants were 
                                                        
68The discussion of the case in this section is limited to the decision of the Land Claims Court. 
The decision was appealed before the Supreme Court of Appeal and again before the 
Constitutional Court. Chapter 4 at 4.2 details the decisions of both the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the Constitutional Court. See Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexcor Ltd and Another 
2003 (6) SA 104 (SCA), Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) 
SA 460 (CC).  
69
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2003 (6) SA 104 (SCA) para 
28. 
70
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1993 (LCC) para 
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permitted to remain on the land, exercising the same rights as they had done in 
the past. When diamonds were discovered in 1925, the Richtersveld people were 
over time denied access to the subject land. The Precious Stones Act71 did not 
recognise the rights of the community to the land, as the land (and therefore their 
right to use it) was not registered.72 They were then forced off the land and into 
reserves. The community’s occupation and use of, as well as trade on the land, 
was criminalised.73 Consequently, the community lost its rights in the land and 
was treated as though it had had no rights to begin with.74 By 1989, all rights to 
the state land had passed to Alexkor Ltd and were registered in favour of Alexkor 
Ltd, a public company of which the government is the sole shareholder.75 
 
In 1998, the Richtersveld community approached the Land Claims Court, 
claiming the subject land on the basis that they had been dispossessed of their 
customary law ownership rights in the subject land by racially discriminatory 
legislative and other action, after 19 June 1913, as a result of past discriminatory 
actions.76 The community’s case was that they held title to the subject land and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
27. 
71Act 44 of 1927. It permitted alluvial diggings over the subject land in terms of various 
Proclamations which also deemed the Richtersveld land to be “unalienated Crown land”. 
72
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para 85. 
73Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para 89. 
74Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para 91. 
75
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1993 (LCC) para 
31. 
76
 In terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 s 2(1), which provides that where a 
claim for restitution of a right in land is made, the restitution must be made to a community 
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that the title had survived the 19 June 1913 cut-off date. Further, they submitted 
that the title fell within the definition of a “right in land”77 as stipulated by the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.78 The right in land was that of customary law 
ownership and in the alternative a right founded on aboriginal title. The 
alternative claimed based on aboriginal title, they contended, allowed the 
community exclusive beneficial occupation and use of the subject land. 
Aboriginal title also gave the community the right to use the subject land for 
certain specific purposes such as habitation, cultural and religious practices, 
grazing, cultivation, hunting, fishing, drawing water as well as the harvesting and 
exploitation of natural resources. Another alternative claim was for a right in land 
over the subject land that was obtained through their beneficial occupation of the 
subject land for ten years prior to their eventual dispossession. 
 
In considering whether the community had rights in the subject land based on 
customary law ownership, the Land Claims Court began by analysing the law of 
the Cape Colony at the time of annexation. The community claimed that they had 
acquired ownership of the subject land by occupatio or res nullius land at the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 and as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws and practices. 
77
 S 1 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 defines “right in land” as “[a]ny right in land 
whether registered or unregistered, and may include the interest of a labour tenant and 
sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement 
and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the 
dispossession in question.” 
78
 22 of 1994. 
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time of annexation.79 However, the court held that the community did not have 
rights of ownership in the subject land after the 1847 annexation by the British 
Crown.80 The court made use of the laws in force in the Cape Colony at the time, 
which regarded the Richtersveld people as lacking in civilisation. Due to this 
perceived lack of civilisation, their occupation was disregarded and their land was 
considered unoccupied territory.81 Although Gildenhuys J cautioned that this line 
of thinking had since undergone change, the changed thinking did not affect land 
title obtained in accordance with the laws of that time.82 
 
The court then considered the community’s alternative claim on the basis of 
rights in land based on aboriginal title. They claimed rights of possession and use 
of the subject land. However, the court was unconvinced of the argument, stating 
instead that the rights claimed by the community were uncertain as there was a 
lack of clarity as to whether the doctrine of aboriginal title formed a part of South 
African law. According to the Land Claims Court, even if aboriginal title was a 
part of South African law, its scope and content remained unknown.83 The court 
also added that it lacked the jurisdiction to develop the common law to allow the 
                                                        
79
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1993 (LCC) para 
37.  
80
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1993 (LCC) para 
43. 
81
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1993 (LCC) para 
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claim based on aboriginal title to succeed.84 However, the court stated that what 
the community referred to as indigenous title may be a customary law interest as 
is entailed in the definition of “right in land” in the Restitution of Land Rights Act.85 
On this point the court reiterated that it lacked the powers to develop the 
common law so as to include a right to indigenous title as a customary interest. 
 
The court then considered the third alternative claim of the community having 
rights in the land based on beneficial occupation. The community relied on rights 
in land that came about as a result of their being in beneficial occupation of the 
subject land for a continuous period of more than ten years before being 
dispossessed.86 Essentially, the land must have been occupied with the 
occupiers intending to benefit from the occupation. The community needed to 
have derived a certain value from the occupation. The court took into 
consideration the evidence submitted by the community that they had regarded 
the subject land as their own and that outsiders needed to obtain permission 
before they could use the subject land.87 The court found that the Richtersveld 
community had beneficial occupation of the subject land prior to the 
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dispossession.88 
 
On the question whether the community had been dispossessed of the right in 
land by past racially discriminatory laws or practices, the court began by stating 
that dispossession is the actual loss of a right in land which occurs at a particular 
point in time. Thereafter, the court considered what constitutes a racially 
discriminatory law or practice and concluded that the “[p]recepts of equality must 
be transgressed for racist reasons”.89 In order to determine the kind of 
dispossession that is envisaged by the Restitution of Land Rights Act, the court 
held that the dispossession had to have occurred as a result of a law or a 
practice that was designed to bring about spatial apartheid.90  
 
With the above in mind, the court then considered whether the community’s 
dispossession had been as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices. In doing so, the court considered the legislation and executive actions 
and omissions that the community alleged were the factual and legal causes of 
the dispossession. In particular, the community cited various proclamations91 
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issued under two pieces of Precious Stones legislation.92 The court did not find 
any of the proclamations or practices racially discriminatory. The community 
stated that as owners of the subject land, they had not received the benefits93 
that a private owner would have been entitled to in terms of the mentioned 
precious stones legislation. Nonetheless, the court held the withholding of the 
benefits was not caused by a racially discriminatory law or practice. The court 
instead held that the withholding of the benefits of ownership was caused by the 
Government’s non-recognition of the community’s ownership of the subject 
land.94  
 
Ultimately, the Land Claims Court concluded, the community was dispossessed 
of the original ownership right over the subject land in 1847, in other words prior 
to the statutory cut-off date of 1913. However, the Land Claims Court did not 
consider the original dispossession. Instead, the court focused on the remaining 
weaker right of beneficial occupation, which survived after the 1913 cut-off date 
and could therefore have founded a restitution claim under the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act in 1994. However, the court held that beneficial occupation was 
a right in land newly created by legislation and as such could not have been 
subject to dispossession in 1927. The restitution claim was rejected on the basis 
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that the 1927 dispossession was not the result of a discriminatory law or practice 
meant to bring about spatial apartheid.95 The main ground for the failure of the 
restitution claim was that the Richtersveld community had failed to show how the 
dispossession had occurred as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices.96 Accordingly, although the court identified a land right that survived 
the 1913 cut-off date, this was held not to have been a right that could have been 
or were shown to have been dispossessed after the cut-off date in terms of 
racially based legislation. 
 
2.3.2 The Popela Land Claim97 
 
The Popela community98 had held exclusive customary law ownership of the 
subject land since the nineteenth century.99 They had enjoyed undisturbed 
indigenous land rights to the land and they had also exercised all the rights that 
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went with such possession of the land. In 1889, in what has been termed the 
“[h]allmark of forcible dispossession of indigenous ownership of land”, the Zuid-
Afrikaanse Republiek granted the subject land to white owners.100  
 
This resulted in the loss of the customary law ownership right over the land that 
the community had previously held.101 The white settlers then required the 
community to provide labour for specified periods annually, changing their status 
to labour tenants. The land owner would give the members of the community 
land on which they could plough their own crops. The land owner would 
determine the number and type of animal each individual member of the 
community was permitted to keep. The labour tenants were permitted to build 
homes for themselves and their families on the subject land. The community 
continued to reside on the land. The surviving right that they exercised over the 
land after the initial dispossession of their ownership right in 1889 was mere 
labour tenancy.102 
 
This remained the status quo until 1969, when the then owners of the land 
decided to terminate the labour tenancies. The community did not receive 
compensation for the loss of the rights to the subject land. They had to cease 
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ploughing on the subject land and were required to get rid of their livestock and 
to enter into wage labour. They then became full time wage earners on the 
subject land. Members of the community who did not agree with the changed 
circumstances left the subject land. They were therefore dispossessed of the 
cropping and grazing rights which they had held under the labour tenancy 
agreements.103 
 
In 2000, the community lodged a claim for the subject land before the Land 
Claims Court104 on the basis that they had been dispossessed of their labour 
tenancy rights in 1969 because of past racially discriminatory practices.105 As 
redress, they sought restitution of the land where they had previously enjoyed 
cropping and grazing rights as well as where their homesteads had been 
situated.106 The claim was lodged by the claimants as a community and, in the 
alternative, as individuals. 
  
The Land Claims Court took cognisance of the fact that the community had been 
dispossessed of sovereignty over the subject land in 1889. However, since the 
dispossession of rights in land in the form of customary law ownership occurred 
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before 1913, the court emphasised that this initial dispossession in terms of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act was not justiciable.107 Instead, the Land Claims 
Court accepted that the remaining rights in the land that the community held 
were in the form of labour tenancies, of which the community was again 
dispossessed in the course of 1969. A restitution claim might therefore be 
possible with regard to these lesser, remaining land rights. However, the court 
found that the evidence that the community could be deemed a community for 
purposes of the Restitution of Land Rights Act was insufficient.108  
 
Thereafter the court considered whether the individual community members had 
been dispossessed of the labour tenancy rights by racially discriminatory laws or 
practices. The community relied on the Bantu Laws Amendment Act,109 which in 
section 22 enabled the inclusion of section 27bis in the Native Trust Land Act,110 
which terminated labour tenancy contracts nationally.111 The community 
contended that the provisions of these laws were racially discriminatory and the 
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court agreed with this contention.112 However, the community was dispossessed 
of their labour tenancy rights in 1969, a year before the racially discriminatory 
laws were published and as such, the court concluded, the community could not 
have been dispossessed as a result of the racially discriminatory laws.113  
 
In addition, the court stated that even though the community members were 
dispossessed of their original ownership over the land in 1889, this was a 
dispossession that fell outside of the ambit of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, 
as it preceded the 19 June 1913 cut-off date. The Land Claims Court ruled that 
the community was not entitled to restitution as there was no link between the 
racially discriminatory laws and their being dispossessed of their individual labour 
tenancy rights. Again, the rights that survived the 1913 cut-off date were not the 
kind of rights that could have been or were shown to have been dispossessed 
after the cut-off date in terms of racially based legislation. 
 
In 2006 the community appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the 
decision of the Land Claims Court.114 The community claimed the subject land on 
the basis that they had been dispossessed of their rights in the land as a result of 
the termination of their labour tenancy relationship between themselves and the 
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registered owners of the land. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, like the court a quo, focused on the dispossession 
of the labour tenancy rights rather than the initial dispossession of the customary 
law ownership originally held by the community over the subject land.115 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the finding of the Land Claims Court that 
individual community members had been dispossessed of their cropping and 
grazing rights as labour tenants. The Supreme Court of Appeal also agreed with 
the finding that the original ownership right that was dispossessed in 1889 fell 
outside of the reach of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. On the other hand, the 
second dispossession in 1969 of the labour tenancy right fell within the scope of 
the Act. Despite finding that the community had a right that was dispossessed in 
1969, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal also considered the real question 
to be whether the dispossession had occurred as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices.116 
 
The court made reference to an amendment to the Native Trust and Land Act.117 
The amendment was in accordance with the Bantu Laws Amendment Act.118 The 
amendment to the Native Trust and Land Act gave the Minister discretion to 
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terminate labour tenancies in instances where the Minister found it in the public 
interest to do so.119 It was only on 31 July 1970 that the Minister published a 
notice in the Government Gazette, effective from that date, which prohibited the 
creation of further labour tenancy contracts. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion was that, even though the amendment to the Native Trust and Land 
Act was racially discriminatory, there was no evidence to suggest that the 
landowners, in terminating the labour tenancies, had acted with that 
knowledge.120 This was due to the fact that the claimants’ labour tenancies were 
terminated in 1969, a year before the laws came into effect. The community had 
attempted to show that the landowners had been aware of the intention of the 
government to phase out labour tenancy and that the landowners had acted with 
knowledge of this policy.121 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal found no 
evidence to suggest that the landowners had been influenced by knowledge of 
this policy. The landowner’s reasons for ending the labour tenancy were that it 
was outdated and inefficient and that neighbours who had done the same were 
benefiting from the change.122 The court found the latter to be sufficient reason 
for terminating the labour tenancies.123 Hence, the court found that there was an 
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insufficient connection between the racially motivated law or practice and the 
dispossession of the labour tenancy rights. In this instance, the court did not find 
the causal connection that section 2(1) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act calls 
for.124 
 
The claimants also argued that they were a community or part of a community on 
the subject land.125 The landowners responded to this by stating that the farm 
residents did not belong to a group organised enough to be termed a community 
in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.126 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
chose to agree with the ruling of the Land Claims Court, which had found that the 
evidence submitted to establish the existence of a community was 
inconclusive.127 
 
Thus, for the above reasons, underpinned by the finding that the original 
dispossession of ownership was in 1889, with a second dispossession of the 
surviving weaker right in 1969, the land claim failed because the dispossession 
of the surviving right could not satisfy the requirements for a restitution claim 
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under the Act. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The above discussion of South African restitution cases implies that there can be 
no restitution for pre-1913 land dispossessions. These decisions imply that the 
1913 cut-off date can have no other interpretation except that all land 
dispossessions that occurred prior to the cut-off date cannot be restored under 
the Restitution of Land Rights Act. With this line of reasoning, historically based 
land claims that occurred prior to the cut-off date would therefore be left out of 
the restitution process.  
 
Furthermore, although the courts in both cases established that the claimants 
had land rights that survived the 1913 cut-off date, these rights were described in 
such a way that the second, post-1913 dispossession that clearly took place did 
not satisfy the requirements for a restitution claim in terms of the Act, because 
either the right itself or the way in which it was exercised (the community 
requirement) or the dispossession of that right (the racial discrimination 
requirement) was inadequate. In both cases, it is arguable that the first 
dispossession would have qualified, if it were not for the cut-off date, and that the 
second dispossession would also have qualified if the surviving right had not 
been scaled down by the first dispossession. In this way it appears that the lack 
of success in these cases was directly or indirectly caused by the cut-off date. 
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On further appeal, however, both these cases succeeded.128 Chapter 4 of the 
thesis will discuss the appeal decisions in order to reveal a formulation that 
allows for restitution orders within the ambit of the cut-off date in order to include 
historically based land claims that seem to be grounded in pre-1913 
dispossessions, in the restitution process of the Restitution of Land Rights Acts. 
Briefly, in granting the claims for restitution, the appeal courts focused on a 
weaker (mostly use) right that was held to have survived the initial dispossession 
of the stronger right of ownership and that could satisfy the requirements of the 
Act.129 Since the surviving right was dispossessed after 1913, the claims met the 
requirements of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. By identifying and then 
focusing on weaker use rights that are said to have survived the original (mostly 
colonial) dispossession of ownership or sweeping indigenous land rights, the 
courts opened the possibility of considering restitution claims in cases that might 
otherwise seem to be excluded from the ambit of the Restitution Act. 
 
However, the above formulation is only applicable where potential claimants can 
prove the existence of a land right that survived the initial dispossession. As 
such, the question remains whether historical land dispossessions are impossible 
if claimants are unable to prove a surviving right that was again dispossessed 
after the cut-off date.  
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Australia and Canada, unlike South Africa, do not have a cut-off date for land 
restitution claims, because the restitution process in those countries is driven by 
judicial invention and not by legislation. In those countries, the major problem 
with establishing a legitimate foundation for land restitution claims is the aspect 
of sovereignty. Indeed, aspects of the Mabo and the Delgamuukw decisions 
reflect this quandary.130 In order to by-pass the issue of sovereignty, Australian 
and Canadian courts have developed the doctrine of aboriginal title in order to 
allow them to restore land dispossessed at the time that the British Crown 
established territorial sovereignty. Broadly framed, the doctrine of aboriginal title 
maintains that indigenous communities retained an indigenous law title in their 
respective lands, which title acted as a burden on the underlying Crown’s radical 
title to the newly acquired territories. Chapter 3 accordingly discusses, by way of 
case law, the doctrine of aboriginal title in Australia and Canada to determine the 
similarities and differences between the judicial and statutory processes of 
restitution. 
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3 
 
The Doctrine of Aboriginal Title Explored 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Having established the legislative framework governing the South African 
restitution process and noting how the 1913 cut-off date appears to exclude 
historically based land claims, the question remains whether there is any way in 
which pre-1913 dispossessions could be restored. An alternative approach to the 
problem could be found in Australian and Canadian jurisprudence. In these 
jurisdictions, the land reform process has been chiefly driven by the courts rather 
than political will, in the sense that there is no comprehensive legislative basis for 
restitution claims. As such, their land claims process, not being governed by 
legislation, does not have a cut-off date.  
 
In fashioning a remedy for colonial land dispossessions, both Canada and 
Australia found themselves constrained by the problem of the Crown’s 
sovereignty.131 The underlying assumption is that the Crown, in establishing title 
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during colonisation, extinguished all prior existing titles to land. Given the fact 
that the Crown established both sovereignty and title over the land upon 
colonisation, the courts were confronted with the problem that they could not 
reverse the effects of sovereignty without creating all kinds of problems. With this 
line of reasoning, it would have meant that the indigenous proprietary systems 
prior to sovereignty would have been lost through colonisation and not 
recoverable through judicial restitution orders.  
 
South African courts, on the other hand, did not have to grapple with the 
sovereignty issue since the post-apartheid democratic process resulted in a 
constitutional foundation and legislation to govern the land restitution process.   
 
In seeking to overcome the sovereignty issue, Australian and Canadian courts 
have developed the doctrine of aboriginal title in order to redress colonial land 
dispossessions. The core of the doctrine of aboriginal title is that the loss of 
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sovereignty is distinct from the loss of title to land. This means that indigenous 
communities who lose their sovereignty to the Crown at colonisation, could 
possibly retain a weaker interest in the land which is less than full ownership. 
Using aspects such as communality, indigineity and continuity, which are said to 
lie at the heart of the doctrine of aboriginal title, the courts were then able to grant 
restitution of full title to land without interfering with state sovereignty. 
 
This chapter will begin by stating the reasons for the comparative studies and 
thereafter discuss the leading Canadian and Australian cases in this regard, with 
a view to showing how the formulation detailed above has been crafted. The 
chapter also discusses the legislation passed, policies implemented, and 
supporting institutions developed as a direct result of the courts’ development of 
the doctrine of aboriginal title. By way of conclusion, the chapter asks whether 
the doctrine of aboriginal title can be used in South Africa as a means of 
overcoming the remaining implications of the 1913 cut-off date. 
 
3.2 Comparative Studies 
3.2.1 Basis for Comparison 
On the issue of historically based land claims, Canada and Australia have 
relatively developed jurisprudence. Both countries, like South Africa, have 
histories that are characterised by unfair, racially biased land dispossessions. 
Moreover, in all these countries there was a land use system prior to the 
acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown. These countries are what De 
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Villiers refers to as “non-treaty dispensations” in that the colonising power did not 
enter into treaties with the local indigenous people.132 They also share a common 
law system as introduced by the colonising powers.133 Ultimately, all three 
countries have in recent times embarked on some kind of land reform, albeit that 
the South African restitution process is the only one that is explicitly authorised 
by the Constitution and governed by legislation. For these reasons, there is a 
sufficient basis upon which to undertake a comparative study. 
 
However, there are also notable differences due to the differing circumstances 
influencing the respective jurisdictions. Canada and Australia are relatively 
developed first world powers, whereas South Africa is a developing nation with 
millions of people and communities with insecure land rights.134 Importantly, 
neither the Australian135 nor the Canadian136 constitutions make provision for 
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land restitution. This is in contrast to sections 121-123 of the 1993 South African 
Constitution and section 25(7) of the 1996 Constitution, which authorise (and 
require) the promulgation of special restitution legislation. By contrast, historically 
based land claims in Australia and Canada are dealt with purely in terms of 
judicial interpretation and development of the common law. 
 
Another important difference highlighted in the discussion below is that the 
Australian and Canadian recognition of aboriginal title came about through 
litigation which was opposed by the respective governments. Meaningful land 
reforms later followed the initial recognition of restitution claims by the courts.  
 
3.2.2 Australia 
3.2.2.1 The Mabo137 Land Claim 
The Merriam people were in occupation of the Murray Islands in the Torres Strait, 
in North Queensland for many generations before the first European contact. 
Their subsistence was mainly through fishing and hunting. The rights over the 
land were passed from generation to generation through family relationships. 
They viewed the Murray Island as theirs, recognising both individual and small 
group ownership of the land. 
 
In 1788, the British Crown established sovereignty over Australia,138 and in 1879, 
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the Murray Islands were annexed to the State of Queensland.139 This was 
despite the occupation and ownership of the Murray Islands by aboriginal groups. 
The Merriam people were then subjected to British sovereignty, although they 
continued to reside on the subject land, conducting their lives as they had done 
for centuries prior to Crown sovereignty.140 
 
In 1982, the Queensland government enacted the Queensland Amendment Act 
of 1982, which established a system of land grants in trust for the aboriginal 
people residing on Murray Island.141 The Merriam people refused to accept the 
Act and approached the Australian High Court, seeking declarations to the effect 
that they were entitled to Murray Islands as owners, as possessors or as persons 
entitled to use and enjoy the Islands. They claimed a possessory title, which they 
claimed came into being by virtue of their long possession of the Islands. The 
case was sent back to the Queensland Supreme Court for a finding on the facts, 
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and a decade later (in 1992) returned to the Australian High Court for 
determination. In the meantime, in an attempt to terminate the proceedings, the 
state of Queensland enacted the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act of 
1985,142 in terms of which the effect of the 1879 annexation was that title to the 
island was vested in the state of Queensland “[f]reed from all other rights, 
interests and claims whatsoever”.143 
 
In the High Court of Australia, Brennan J, writing for the majority, identified two 
key issues in the case. The first issue was whether the 1879 annexation of the 
Murray Islands had vested in the Crown absolute beneficial ownership of the 
island, including sovereignty, or whether the annexation had only vested 
sovereignty in the Crown.144 The second issue was whether aboriginal title, if 
ever it had existed, had been extinguished by official acts immediately after 
annexation.145 On this point, the Court stressed that ownership of the Island was 
in question, and not sovereignty, since sovereignty could not be challenged in 
municipal courts.146 
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The case of the Queensland government was based upon the notion that upon 
annexation in 1879, the British Crown acquired not only sovereignty but also 
absolute beneficial ownership over the territory, since no-one else had title over 
the land.147 This was a viewpoint based on the extended notion of terra nullius. 
Under customary international law at the time that the British Crown established 
sovereignty over Australia, sovereignty was acquired by conquest, cession, and 
occupation of terra nullius.148 Sovereignty over land is distinguished from 
ownership of land. Sovereignty can only be acquired by a sovereign power and is 
essentially the political power to govern territory. Ownership, on the other hand, 
can belong to anyone and is the private title to a piece of property, namely the 
right to possess, occupy, use, and enjoy that property.149 Regardless of this 
distinction, acquisition of sovereignty through the occupation of terra nullius came 
to be equated with acquisition of absolute beneficial ownership by the sovereign 
when there was “no other proprietor of such lands.”150 This was a logical 
deduction under the original conception of terra nullius, which contemplated 
unoccupied waste land. The then property doctrine was founded on possession. 
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This meant that if no other persons were present to assert possession of land, 
then the Crown could assert both sovereignty and ownership through 
occupation.151 Customary international law expanded the terra nullius152 doctrine 
to include, in addition to the acquisition of sovereignty, the exercise of ownership 
over land that was inhabited. This kind of acquisition was considered justifiable if 
the indigenous inhabitants were so “[l]ow in the scale of social organisation that 
their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with 
the institutions or the legal ideas of civilised society.”153 The court rejected this 
notion and declared is as “[f]alse in fact and unacceptable in society.”154 As such, 
the Crown did not automatically acquire universal and absolute ownership of land 
upon colonisation, even though it did establish sovereignty. Whether the Crown 
also acquired ownership through establishment of sovereignty depended upon 
the question whether there were prior rights in indigenous law. 
 
Brennan J then turned to the question whether aboriginal title, if it existed to 
begin with, had been extinguished by sovereign acts after annexation. He began 
by stating that aboriginal title has its origins in and that its content flows from the 
traditional laws and traditional customs practiced by the indigenous inhabitants of 
a territory.155 However, the precise nature of the aboriginal title is dependent 
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upon the indigenous community, although there are common characteristics. 
Furthermore, although the colonising power could extinguish existing indigenous 
law through legislation, a law that merely regulates the exercise of aboriginal title 
does not extinguish aboriginal title.156 
 
Applying the above principles to the Merriam people, the court held that the land 
in the Murray Islands is not Crown land and that the Merriam people are entitled 
as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the 
island of Mer, a right enforceable against the whole world. 
 
The court’s view ultimately was that a change in sovereignty did not automatically 
extinguish aboriginal title to land.157 The court’s strategy was to find incidents of 
ownership that survived the establishment of crown sovereignty. These incidents 
then acted as a burden on the crown’s radical title.158 The Mabo decision 
distinguished acts of sovereignty from ownership of land title.159 For the Merriam 
people, this meant that the loss of sovereignty could not be equated with the loss 
of proprietary ownership.  
 
                                                        
156
 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 para 42. Brennan CJ cited 
little Australian authority for his account of the nature and scope of aboriginal title, although he 
drew references from Canadian, American and New Zealand authorities. His account in any 
event begins with the preface that “[s]ome general propositions about native title can be stated 
without reference to evidence.” 
157
 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 para 45. 
158
 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 para 45. 
159
 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 para 45. 
  
 
58 
In other words, aboriginal title “crystallised”160 at annexation, whereas the content 
of aboriginal title existed before the Crown established sovereignty. Aboriginal 
title is a stronger right than its content as it is a complete right of ownership. The 
contents of the aboriginal title, which included but were not limited to, the 
existence of an identifiable group or community with a traditional connection to 
the subject land, traditional laws and customs as well as a measure of continuity, 
survived the annexation. 
 
The Queensland Amendment Act161 and the Queensland Coast Islands 
Declaratory Act162 sought to curtail the surviving incidents of the successful 
claimants’ original ownership over the Murray Islands. Hence, the Islanders 
sought to regain the title to land that they had previously enjoyed. The court held 
that both pieces of legislation were invalid and that certain incidents of aboriginal 
title had survived the annexation. As a result of this, the court returned full rights 
in land to the Merriam people. In granting the order for the restitution of the land, 
the Australian High Court focused on one aspect of the content of aboriginal title 
which survived the original dispossession of full ownership. This content, in the 
form of occupancy of the subject land, was categorised as proprietary “[i]n order 
that it survive a change in sovereignty”.163 In this regard the court focused on the 
community’s exclusive possession of the land. The court considered that the 
Merriam people  saw themselves as the sole occupiers of the Murray Islands and 
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concluded that this was an interest in the land which “[m]ust be proprietary in 
nature”.164 As such, the full ownership of the Murray Islands was restored to the 
Merriam people. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Mabo Aftermath 
Following the Mabo decision, the Native Title Act of 1993 was enacted in order to 
provide a means by which aboriginal title, as recognised by the common law, 
could be claimed in a restitution action and also to balance its relationship with 
other interests in land. The Native Title Act defines aboriginal title as the group, 
individual or communal rights and interests of aboriginal people and Torres Strait 
Islanders, held under traditionally acknowledged laws and traditionally observed 
customs.165 The laws and customs of the aboriginal people must have a 
connection to the land and the water. The rights and interests must be 
recognised by Australian common law. 
  
The Preamble of the Native Title Act provides that the Act represents the 
intention of Australian people to correct the consequences of prior injustices and 
to guarantee that aboriginal people receive “[t]he full recognition and status within 
the Australian nation to which history, prior rights and interests and their rich and 
diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire.”166 Its main objectives are to ensure 
the recognition and protection of native title and to create a means by which 
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aboriginal title may be dealt with. It also establishes mechanisms and procedures 
to be followed in the verification of aboriginal title claims. 
 
The Native Title Act167 describes aboriginal title as a co-existing right to land, 
distinct from leasehold and freehold title. This right to land in terms of the Native 
Title Act does not offer the same range of management and control capabilities 
that arise from either leasehold or freehold title. In fact, De Villiers views 
aboriginal title as being the least important land right and subject to 
extinguishment or limitation by the rights of others.168 
 
In terms of the Native Title Act, there are four main institutions that facilitate land 
claims in Australia, namely the Federal Court, the National Native Title Tribunal, 
Representative Bodies and Prescribed Bodies Corporate.169 The Federal Court is 
not a specialised land court like the South African Land Claims Court. By 
contrast, the Land Claims Court is part of the machinery designed to promote the 
transformative goals of the South African Constitution and its specialised focus 
forms a part of the new post-1994 transformative agenda. On the other hand, the 
National Native Tribunal established by the Australian Native Title Act has a host 
of objectives which include the registration of native title claims as well as the 
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mediation and arbitration of land claims based on native claims. The Native Title 
Act further establishes representative bodies known as land councils, whose 
functions resemble those of the Land Claims Commission in South Africa.170 
These bodies assist claimants in native title claims and other related matters. 
They mostly carry out research, prepare claims and also assist in the mediation 
and resolution of disagreements. 
 
The final institution tasked with native title claims in Australia comprises various 
Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBC). The PBC can hold native title either as a 
trustee or on behalf of the community. The PBC is to ensure that the group 
members can be identified with sufficient certainty. It normally has a vast range 
of functions, which include the holding of native title on behalf of a group and the 
development of whatever policies the group adopts. There are, however, very 
few PBCs owing to the fact that their capacity to fulfil their obligations under the 
Native Title Act is severely constrained due to uncertain funding and because 
there is no scheme with which to facilitate their running.171 
 
3.2.3 Canada 
3.2.3.1. Before Delgamuukw 
The decision in Delgamuukw v British Columbia172 was the first definitive 
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Canadian ruling on the content of aboriginal title in Canada. The decision also 
states the scope of protection that is afforded to aboriginal title in terms of section 
35(1) of the Constitution Act.173 In addition, the decision outlines how aboriginal 
title may be proved as well as the instances in which it may be justifiably 
infringed upon. 
 
Canada does not have an explicit restitution policy, let alone restitution 
legislation. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 first gave recognition, albeit limited, 
of aboriginal rights to land. The Indian Act of 1876 followed, influenced by the 
legislative foundation laid by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It set guidelines 
which determined the day to day existence of First Nations Canadians. It was 
only in 1951 that a provision expressly barring aboriginal Canadian communities 
from engaging the services of an attorney to institute a land claims was repealed. 
From then on until 1969, land claims were dealt with on a case by case basis 
without a general policy to resolve land claims.  
 
In 1969 the federal government published the White Paper on Indian Policy.174 Its 
intention was to completely assimilate First Nations people into the prevailing 
Euro-Canadian society by granting the First Nations people the status of “equal 
citizens”.175 This policy underscored the notion that aboriginal title had ceased to 
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exist due to its being extinguished by various legislation and treaties.176 The 
resulting objections from aboriginal groups persuaded the federal government to 
shelve the proposals. The same White Paper saw the establishment of the Indian 
Claims Commission, but this Commission was disbanded in 1977.177 
 
Before the Delgamuukw decision, Canadian courts had tried to define the nature 
of the interest in land held by aboriginal peoples. Calder v The Attorney General 
of British Columbia178 held that “Indian title” was a legal right, that was arising out 
of  aboriginal peoples’ historic “occupation, possession and use” of traditional 
territories.179 From this definition, aboriginal title first came into existence at the 
time of colonisation even if the colonisers did not recognise the title. In Guerin v 
The Queen180 it was said to be as a unique interest in land that was “best 
characterized by its general inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is 
under an obligation to deal with the land on the Indians’ behalf when the interest 
is surrendered.” In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v Paul,181 the Court held that aboriginal 
title was a sui generis interest in land, adding that “[i]t is more than the right to 
enjoyment and occupancy, although … it is difficult to describe what more in 
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traditional property law terminology.”182 
 
In 1982, Canada adopted a new Constitution which in subsection 35(1) 
recognised and affirmed existing aboriginal rights, provided they had not been 
the subject of prior extinguishment.183 Prior to Delgamuukw, aboriginal rights 
cases mainly pertained to aboriginal fishing rights.184 Sparrow v R185 set out 
general principles which included a statement that subsection 35(1) was 
purposed to recognise the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal people 
and that the prior occupancy should be reconciled with the Crown’s assertion of 
sovereignty.186 “Existing rights” as referred to in subsection 35(1) meant rights 
that as of 1982 had not been extinguished. The aboriginal rights in subsection 
35(1) could limit both federal and provincial laws pertaining to aboriginal people, 
but this did not provide immunity from general government regulation.187 In any 
legislation that infringed upon aboriginal rights, the Crown had to justify such 
action.188 On the definition of aboriginal rights, they were said to be as a result of 
the traditions and norms of the aboriginal peoples prior to European contact.189 
The aboriginal rights, in order to be recognised as such must have been a 
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definitive feature of the aboriginal culture.190 The recognition of subsection 35(1) 
aboriginal rights was not dependent upon aboriginal title or recognition by 
colonial powers. Aboriginal title was a discrete species of aboriginal rights.191 
Ultimately, when courts were adjudicating aboriginal rights matters, the courts 
had to be aware of the special nature of aboriginal claims hence rules of 
evidence and interpretation had to be approached with caution.192  
 
From the discussion above, Delgamuukw then had to adapt the principles set out 
in Sparrow, particularly with regard to the notion that aboriginal title is a discrete 
species of the constitutional aboriginal right. 
 
3.2.3.2 The Delgamuukw Land Claim and Analysis 
In 1984, Chiefs from the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en houses instituted 
proceedings against the Province of British Columbia. Their claim was both 
individually and on behalf of their respective houses. They claimed ownership 
over portions of British Columbia. In setting out the claim, they recognised the 
Crown’s underlying title to the lands, but they asserted a view that their claims 
were a burden on the Crown’s title. They also sought compensation for lost lands 
and resources. The British Columbia province contended that the aboriginal 
peoples had neither a right nor an interest in the land, and that their claim for 
compensation had to be directed at the federal government instead. 
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In March 1991, McEachern CJ of the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
dismissed the aboriginal people’s claims to aboriginal title, self-government and 
aboriginal rights.193 At the essence of the judgment was that aboriginal title and 
aboriginal rights were synonymous and that aboriginal rights held prior to 1982 
Constitution existed at the pleasure of the Crown and provided the intention to do 
so was clear, could be extinguished.194 McEachern CJ held that aboriginal rights 
and therefore title had been extinguished over the subject land.195 In addition, the 
decision found that title vested in the Crown when the Crown established 
sovereignty over British Columbia. Furthermore, the British Columbia Province 
had title to the province alongside the right to dispose of unburdened Crown land 
and in addition to the right to govern the province within the terms of section 92 
of the 1867 Constitution.196 However, he held that the Crown had a fiduciary 
obligation to allow the plaintiffs to use unoccupied Crown lands for subsistence 
purposes.197  
 
With this reasoning, the aboriginal title and aboriginal right of self-government 
claimed by the plaintiffs had been extinguished and therefore fell out of the 
subsection 35(1) definition of “existing rights” under the 1982 Constitution. The 
ruling was met with much criticism for both its conservatism as well as an 
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underlying bias in its approach.198  
 
On appeal before the British Columbia Court of Appeal,199 the broad 
extinguishment of the claimants’ aboriginal rights was rejected. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, by a 3-2 majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal, declaring that the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en “[have unextinguished non-
exclusive aboriginal rights, other than a right of ownership or a property right.”200 
These aboriginal rights were protected by the common law and, since 1982, by 
subsection 35(1) of the Constitution.201 These rights were found in the subject 
land. However, the exact scope, content and results of these use rights and 
occupation were not defined. The issues were referred back to the trial judge for 
determination. In addition, the litigating parties were urged to rather resolve their 
differences through consultation and negotiation.202  
 
In March 1994, the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en and the Province of British 
Columbia were granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal the decision of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.  
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In 1997 the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decision.203 For procedural 
reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada could not delve into the merits of the 
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en claims and the matter was referred back to the trial 
court with the directive that the trial court should take into account the oral 
evidence tradition of the aboriginal claimants.  
 
Lamer CJ stated that the sui generis nature of aboriginal title functions as the 
principle that underlies its varying facets.204 As such, aboriginal title is inalienable 
and can only be transferred or surrendered to the Crown.205 This, however, does 
not detract from it being a proprietary interest. The source of aboriginal title is 
firstly from occupation of Canada by aboriginal people prior to the Royal 
Proclamation.206 Secondly, under common law principles, occupation amounts to 
possession in law and finally, the relationship between common law and pre-
existing systems of aboriginal law are what gave rise to aboriginal title in law.207 
Finally, Lamer CJ stated that aboriginal nature is communal in nature and is a 
group right to land which all members of an aboriginal nation can hold.208 It is for 
these reasons that the features of aboriginal title cannot be explained under the 
rules of common law or indeed under rules of the aboriginal systems. 
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Detailing the contents of aboriginal title, Lamer CJ stated that aboriginal title was 
not restricted to activities that were distinct to the aboriginal group claiming the 
aboriginal title.209 Essentially, lands held under aboriginal title are not precluded 
from non-traditional forms of exploitation.210 
 
Lamer CJ stated that there were, however, limits to the content of aboriginal title 
that came about as a result of its sui generis nature. Since prior occupation is the 
source of aboriginal title, the law then provides legal protection to the prior 
occupancy, albeit in present times.211 Hence there has to be continuity in the 
relationship between the aboriginal community and the land. This means that 
aboriginal title is lost once the aboriginal land use becomes “[i[rreconliable with 
the nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular 
group has had with the land which together have given rise to aboriginal title in 
the first place”.212 This viewpoint also applied to the inalienability of lands held by 
aboriginal title, since alienation would terminate not just the entitlement to occupy 
the land but also any special relationship with the land.213  
 
Importantly, Lamer CJ placed emphasis on the fact that the limitation placed on 
the use of lands held by aboriginal title did not necessarily translate into a proviso 
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that lands held by aboriginal title could only be used for traditional activities.214 
Such an approach would amount to an unfair restriction to those that have 
“[l]egitimate legal claim to the land.”215  
 
Delgamuukw confirmed that common law aboriginal title, previously recognised 
as a common law aboriginal right before 1982, was constitutionalised.216 In 
addition, aboriginal title was more than the right to engage in activities which are 
characteristic of the aboriginal cultures.217 Aboriginal title is a right to the land 
itself.218 
 
Lamer CJ then set out tests to be followed in proving aboriginal title. The starting 
point for such tests is the notion of aboriginal title acts as a burden on the 
Crown’s underlying title.219 This means that aboriginal title only came to be at the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. Their aboriginal title “crystallised” at that 
time.220 In terms of English common law, occupation or possession grounds 
aboriginal title even without proof that the land was integral to aboriginal society 
prior to contact with European settlers.221 
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Lamer CJ stated that both the common law and the aboriginal view of land were 
essential in order to establish occupancy.222 With common law, the fact of 
physical occupation proves legal possession of the land, which in turn gives title 
to the land.223 This occupation can be established in a variety of ways such as 
construction or resource extraction.224 In gauging whether a sufficient degree of 
occupation has been established in order to ground title, aspects such as the 
size and lifestyle of the group claiming aboriginal title are to be taken into 
consideration.225  
 
Recognising that there may be a lack of conclusive evidence to establish 
occupation prior to Crown sovereignty, a group claiming aboriginal title may 
prove such occupation through presenting evidence of present occupation.226 
The present occupation should be complemented by evidence of continuity in the 
form of “[s]ubstantial maintenance of connection” with the subject land.227 
 
Exclusive occupation must have been present when sovereignty was 
established.228 This requirement is proved using both common law and aboriginal 
perspectives. Thus, notwithstanding the English common law principle of 
exclusivity associated with fee simple ownership, the test for exclusive 
                                                        
222
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 146. 
223
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 147. 
224
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 149. 
225
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 148. 
226
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 152. 
227
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 153. 
228
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 155. 
  
 
72 
occupation in aboriginal title claims takes into consideration the nature aboriginal 
society in question at sovereignty.229 In this way, exclusive occupation can be 
shown if there were other aboriginal groups present or frequenting the subject 
land.230 Additionally, the exclusivity requirement does not rule out the prospect of 
title shared between two or more aboriginal nations.231 
 
Once an indigenous group has sufficiently proven exclusive occupation at the 
time of colonisation, it is presumed that occupation has continued to the present 
day. It is therefore incumbent upon the defendant to rebut the presumption by 
showing that the title was lost. Should the title be lost, aboriginal title is said to 
have been extinguished. Since extinguishment works in relation to the principle 
that aboriginal title is inalienable to all but the Crown, the defendant must show 
that aboriginal title was lost through transfer to the Crown.232  
 
The Crown can declare itself owner of the land and, in doing so, extinguish 
aboriginal title. There must, however, be a plain and clear intention to extinguish 
aboriginal title and any legislation purporting to abolish aboriginal title must be 
applicable to specific land.233 The aboriginal community need not be specifically 
mentioned in the legislation abolishing aboriginal title.  
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There is a presumption that the colonial power did not intend to abolish aboriginal 
title upon acquiring sovereignty. The effect of this presumption is that aboriginal 
communities are given the benefit of the doubt where legislation purporting to 
extinguish aboriginal title is ambiguous.234  
 
When an aboriginal group has successfully shown that its title has not been 
extinguished, the Crown may infringe upon the existing right of aboriginal title. 
Lamer CJ enumerated the instances in which aboriginal title may be infringed 
upon.235 To begin with, the infringement must be in the furtherance of a 
compelling legislative purpose since “[a]boriginal societies are part of a broader 
community over which the Crown is sovereign, [hence] limitations on Aboriginal 
rights will sometimes be justified in the pursuit of objectives of importance to the 
community as a whole, and are a necessary part of the reconciliation of 
aboriginal societies with the broader community.”236 
 
In addition, infringement must also be in line with the Crown’s fiduciary duty 
towards aboriginal peoples.237 This is, however, dependent upon the impact of 
infringement on the aboriginal right at issue. Thus the Crown is under a duty to 
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provide compensation if need be, where a right has been infringed upon.238 
 
Lamer CJ rejected British Columbia’s contention that it had held the power to 
extinguish aboriginal rights, which included aboriginal title prior to the 
constitutionalisation of aboriginal rights.239 Referring the matter back to the court 
a quo for deliberation on the land claim, Lamer CJ in addition encouraged the 
parties to negotiate rather than litigate advising that negotiated settlements “[w]ith 
good faith and give and take on all sides would achieve the reconciliation 
purpose of subsection 35(1).”240 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s Delgamuukw decision, although not ruling on 
the merits of the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en aboriginal title claim, affirms the 
existence of aboriginal title in Canada. The decision also underscores that 
aboriginal title has a constitutionally protected status within the Canadian legal 
system. The Delgamuukw directives offer aboriginal claimants and the lower 
courts a wide-ranging set of guidelines for future settlement or litigation other 
comprehensive land claims. The Delgamuukw decision provides a theoretical 
framework that acts as a platform for developing the law of aboriginal title in 
Canada. 
 
Importantly, the Delgamuukw decision placed emphasis on aspects such as 
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communality, group continuity, as well as traditional laws and customs in order to 
ground the content of the aboriginal right. Since the latter concepts survived 
Crown sovereignty, they formed the bases of aboriginal title which in itself is a 
complete ownership right, albeit placed as a burden on the underlying Crown 
title. This formulation for Canada means that the sovereignty aspect is left intact 
whilst simultaneously restoring full ownership over land dispossessed through 
the imposition of Crown sovereignty. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
From the discussion above it appears that Australia and Canada did not have a 
cut-off date for their judicially conceived land claims processes. Their position 
was unlike the South African situation, which has to take cognisance of the cut-
off date of 19 June 1913 because the land restitution process is authorised by 
the Constitution and regulated by special legislation, both of which impose this 
cut-off date on the restitution process. A potential stumbling block for both 
Australia and Canada is the fact that the courts, in crafting remedies for the 
restoration of colonial land dispossessions, may not question the sovereignty of 
the Crown. This is because, in the words of Brennan J “[t]he question whether a 
territory has been acquired by the Crown is not justiciable before municipal 
courts, those courts [only] have jurisdiction to determine the consequences of an 
acquisition under municipal law”.241 
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Hence, using the English common law doctrine of tenure, in terms of which the 
Crown held radical title over all land, the doctrine of aboriginal title was then said 
to act as a burden on the underlying Crown’s title. Importantly, as was clearly 
stated in Mabo, a change in sovereignty did not extinguish prior titles to land. In 
recognising the surviving interests after the loss of sovereignty, the Mabo 
decision assigned a proprietary nature to such surviving interest. Having done 
this, the court’s conclusion was that the aboriginal title had survived the original 
dispossession that took place when the Crown established sovereignty. Using 
this formulation, a right of full ownership was restored in the restitution process. 
 
Hence the question to be asked is whether the doctrine of aboriginal title could 
be a solution to the problem of the exclusion of historically based land claims in 
South Africa, where the restitution process is regulated by legislation. Although 
the restitution claims were eventually successful in the Richtersveld242 and 
Popela243 decisions, after initial indications that these claims might be excluded 
on the basis of the cut-off date, the appeal courts did not use the doctrine of 
aboriginal title in allowing the claims. However, in deciding that these claims 
should succeed the courts followed a formulation which is not unlike that 
described in the Australian and Canadian cases above. Above all, the logic by 
which the South African courts distinguished between an initial colonial 
dispossession (prior to the cut-off date) and a right that survived the initial 
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dispossession bears more than a passing resemblance to the distinction between 
sovereignty and title in the Australian and Canadian cases. These similarities and 
the detail of the South African decisions are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
In Chapter 4 it will be argued that there is no need for the doctrine of aboriginal 
title within the South African context since the distinction between original 
dispossession and surviving rights, which may or may not have been inspired by 
the decisions in Delgamuukw and Mabo, could be used to successfully restore 
previously dispossessed full rights of ownership within the ambit of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.244 Chapter 4 expands on this discussion. 
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4 
Reconsidering Historically Based Land Claims in South Africa 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The Australian and Canadian land claims processes, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
not being governed by legislation, do not have a cut-off date. In crafting a remedy 
for colonial land dispossessions, the Australian and Canadian courts had to 
construct a remedy that would not compromise the sovereignty of the Crown 
since the Crown acquired not just sovereignty through colonisation, but also title 
to land. Since the sovereignty of the Crown cannot be challenged by municipal 
courts, it would have meant that indigenous populations dispossessed of land at 
the establishment of sovereignty would have had no recourse. Accordingly, the 
doctrine of aboriginal title is premised upon the idea that there is a distinction 
between the loss of sovereignty and the loss of title. The surviving incidents of 
aboriginal title are said to be a burden on the underlying Crown’s radical title. In 
this formulation, the sovereignty of the Crown is left intact, while restitution claims 
become possible.  
 
South Africa, on the other hand, does not have to grapple with the sovereignty 
question since there is constitutional authority and a legislative framework for the 
restitution of previously dispossessed land. However, the 1913 cut-off date for 
restitution claims, as detailed in Chapter 2, appears to intentionally exclude 
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historically based land claims. It then would appear as if aboriginal title might be 
a solution to the apparent exclusion of pre-1913 land dispossessions. However, 
two recent decisions suggest that historically based land claims are not, after all, 
necessarily excluded from the restitution process. Importantly, these decisions 
followed an approach that recognised the existence of a weaker right which, 
having survived the original dispossession under colonial dispossession, was 
then the subject of a second dispossession under apartheid, which in turn 
opened up the possibility to restore full ownership rights through a restitution 
process. Equally important is the fact that all this took place within the framework 
of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. The formulation, which can be 
said to be a fragmentation of proprietary interests, is not unlike the Mabo245 and 
Delgamuukw246 logic as recounted in Chapter 3. 
 
This chapter details the appeal decisions in Richtersveld247 and Popela.248 The 
chapter discusses how the formulation of the decisions can be used to include 
cases that, at face value, are excluded by the cut-off date. The chapter also 
discusses whether and how the doctrine of aboriginal title could still be applicable 
in South Africa, given the logic of Mabo and Delgamuukw. A lingering question is 
whether there could still be cases that cannot be resolved in spite of the above 
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formulation. 
 
4.2 The Richtersveld Land Claim 
As previously discussed, the, the Land Claims Court concluded that the 
Richtersveld community had been dispossessed of the original ownership right 
over the subject land in 1847, prior to the statutory cut-off date of 1913. However, 
the Land Claims Court did not consider only the original dispossession, electing 
instead to focus on the remaining weaker right of beneficial occupation, which 
survived after the 1913 cut-off date and could therefore have founded a 
restitution claim under the Restitution of land Rights Act.249 Eventually the court 
held that beneficial occupation was a right in land newly created by legislation250 
and as such could not have been subject to dispossession in 1927. The 
restitution claim was rejected on the basis that the 1927 dispossession was not 
the result of a discriminatory law or practice meant to bring about spatial 
apartheid.251 The main ground for the failure of the restitution claim, underpinned 
by the disregard for the pre-1913 dispossession, was that the Richtersveld 
community had failed to show how the second dispossession had occurred as a 
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result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.252 Although the case 
initially failed because of the racially discrimination requirement and not the cut-
off date, it is arguable that the cut-off date was ultimately at the basis of the 
decision, since it would have been more difficult to uphold the court’s argument if 
the original right had not been scaled down by the initial dispossession. 
 
The Richtersveld community then appealed the decision of the Land Claims 
Court before the Supreme Court of Appeal.253 They contended that in addition to 
the right to beneficial occupation for ten years as was found by the Land Claims 
Court,254 they possessed further rights in the subject land that survived the cut-off 
date of 19 June 1913. These rights were ownership as well as the right to use the 
subject land for certain specified purposes, such as “[h]abitation, cultural and 
religious practices, grazing, cultivation, hunting, fishing, ‘water-trekking’ and the 
harvesting and exploitation of natural resources.”255 The community contended 
that they held these rights on two bases. The first was in terms of their 
indigenous law and the second under colonial law, which allowed the continued 
protection of existing land rights of inhabitants at the time of annexation in 
1847.256 An alternative contention was that the rights the community had held in 
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the subject land in terms of their own indigenous law constituted a customary law 
interest and therefore met the “right in land”257 requirement as stipulated by the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act. 
 
The court began by considering the community’s customary law interest. The 
court stated that in respect of an indigenous law right of occupation, 
uninterrupted presence on the land did not necessarily translate into possession 
at common law.258 Furthermore, a nomadic lifestyle did not interfere with the 
exclusive and effective right of occupation of land by indigenous people. 
Therefore, even if the community’s use of the subject land was seasonal, it did 
not cancel their exclusive beneficial occupation of the land.  
 
Concerning the ruling of the Land Claims Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the court a quo had erred in finding that the community only had a right 
to beneficial occupation for a continuous period of ten years during the twentieth 
century. The Land Claims Court had also erred in finding no customary law 
interest in land within the definition of “right in land” in the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act had been proved.259 The court a quo, according to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, had been mistaken in considering whether at the time of annexation 
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“[t]here existed a custom which had become applicable law, in terms of which the 
State was obliged to recognise rights of the first plaintiff over the subject land”.260 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that at the time of annexation, the 
Richtersveld community had a customary law interest in terms of their indigenous 
customary laws that also permitted exclusive occupation and use of the subject 
land.261 Furthermore, this customary law interest was synonymous with the right 
of ownership held under common law.”262 At the time of annexation, the 
community had enjoyed exclusive occupation of the subject land. This right to 
exclusive occupation was the result of the traditional laws and customs of the 
Richtersveld people. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the 
customary law interest fell within the definition of the “right in land”263 as is 
required by the Restitution of Land Rights Act. The basic content of the interest 
was a right to exclusive beneficial occupation and use of the subject land. In 
addition, the Supreme Court of Appeal, although not finding evidence to suggest 
that the community had engaged in mining activities on the subject land itself, 
accepted evidence that at the time of annexation, the culture of the Richtersveld 
community had been to acquire rights to minerals and natural resources on the 
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land.264 
 
The tacit State policy was that the subject land was made Crown territory upon 
annexation because the Richtersvelders were insufficiently civilised – this view 
was premised upon the race of the Richtersveld community and hence the 
racially discriminatory element was patently clear for the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. The appeal succeeded and the community was found to be entitled to 
the right to exclusive beneficial occupation and use similar to that held under 
common law ownership265 of the subject land, which included its minerals as well 
as its precious stones. 
 
Alexkor then appealed to the Constitutional Court on the basis that any rights in 
the subject land in which the Richtersveld Community might have held were 
terminated by the 1847 annexation.266 Furthermore, according to Alexkor, the 
dispossession was not the result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices.267  
 
Regarding the land rights held by the community at the time of annexation, the 
Constitutional Court accepted evidence that showed that the community had a 
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history of prospecting in minerals, even though the community had never used 
the subject land for that purpose, and that this was in line with the viewpoint that 
the community was the owner of the minerals.268 The Constitutional Courts’ 
conclusion on this score was that the nature of the title that the community held 
in the subject land was a right of communal ownership under indigenous law.269 
The content of the right included occupation and use of the subject land by 
community members. Thus, for the Constitutional Court, prior to annexation the 
Richtersveld community had a right of ownership in the subject land and this right 
of ownership was held under indigenous law.270 
 
Alexkor contended that, upon annexation in 1847, the subject land had become 
Crown property. Following this line of reasoning, Alexkor’s further contention was 
that the community had then lost all title to the subject land and since this 
occurred before the cut-off date, therefore the community’s claim had to fail.271 
However, the Constitutional Court endorsed the ruling of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal that indigenous rights to private property in a conquered territory were 
both recognised and protected after the Crown acquired sovereignty. The 
Richtersvelders were, in terms of the Proclamation,272 establishing Crown 
sovereignty in “[b]ona fide and beneficial occupation of the land without title 
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deed”.273 That then remained the position of the Richtersveld Community until 
1926, when diamonds were discovered on the subject land. 
 
The effect of the Precious Stones Act was that it made the continued occupation 
of the subject land by the Richtersveld Community unlawful.274 The community 
was then dispossessed of whatever rights in the land they had that survived the 
annexation. The dispossession of their rights was as a direct consequence of the 
Precious Stones Act as well as the Proclamations issued in accordance with the 
Act. Thereafter, the state had assumed ownership of the subject land and forced 
the community off the land. 
 
The Constitutional Court subsequently considered whether the dispossession 
was the result of racially discriminatory laws or practices. The court emphasised 
that the Precious Stones Act and the Proclamations issued under it did not 
recognise indigenous law ownership and thus prohibited the community from the 
subject land and barred them from exploiting the mineral wealth on the subject 
land.275 On the other hand, registered ownership was both recognised and 
protected. Registered land owners were mostly white.276 Since black 
communities in South Africa have, since time immemorial, held land in terms of 
                                                        
273
 S 12 of the Crown Lands Disposal Act of 1887. 
274
 S 103(5) and 103(6) made it a criminal offence for members of the community to occupy, trade 
on or use any portion of the proclaimed land outside of tacit authority from the State. In terms of s 
103(6) it was also illegal to for any individual to utilise water within the proclaimed land. 
275
  Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) 
paras 89-90. 
276
 Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para 95. 
  
 
87 
indigenous law ownership, the Precious Stones Act’s failure to recognise 
indigenous land ownership was discriminatory towards black indigenous land 
owners.277 The Constitutional Court’s conclusion therefore was that the 
Richtersveld Community was dispossessed of the subject land on grounds of 
race.278 
 
The Constitutional Court ultimately found that the Richtersveld Community was 
entitled, in terms of section 2(1) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, to 
restitution of the right to ownership279 of the subject land, including its minerals 
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and precious stones.280 
 
In summing up the Richtersveld decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court placed emphasis on the use rights of the Richtersveld 
community. These use rights were said to be “[h]abitation, cultural and religious 
practices, grazing, cultivation, hunting, fishing, ‘water-trekking’ and the harvesting 
and exploitation of natural resources.”281 These use rights were less 
comprehensive than the Roman-Dutch law concept of ownership.282 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal then characterised the use rights as a customary law 
interest “[a]kin to that held under common law ownership.” The Constitutional 
Court recharacterised the use right as an indigenous law ownership right. The 
restitution claimed succeeded and the community had their full rights of 
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ownership restored. 
 
From the above it appears that the claim succeeded on appeal because the court 
was willing to not only recognise the existence of a use right that survived the 
cut-off date for restitution claims, but also to understand the nature of that right in 
a way that would enable a restitution claim under the requirements of the Act, 
instead of allowing historical prejudice to paint the right in a way that would make 
it impossible to satisfy the restitution requirements even if the right survived 
colonisation. 
 
4.3 The Popela Land Claim 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Popela community’s land claim had failed as the 
Land Claims Court ruled that the community was not entitled to restitution since 
there was no link between the racially discriminatory laws and their being 
dispossessed of their weaker, surviving individual labour tenancy rights in 1969. 
Despite acknowledging the community’s original ownership over the subject land, 
both the Land Claims Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal stressed that the 
1889 original dispossession fell outside of the ambit of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act.  
 
In 2007, the Constitutional Court heard the claimants’ appeal against the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.283 The court began with a discussion 
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of the community’s history, emphasising that community had previously held 
undisturbed customary law ownership of the land until 1889 when the Zuid-
Afrikaanse Republiek granted the land to white owners.284 The community was 
then compelled to become labour tenants in order to remain on the land. 
 
The subject land saw a succession of registered owners, with the community 
continuing to live on the land as labour tenants. The community had to work for 
the registered owner of the land so as to be allowed to continue living there. By 
1969, the court stated, the status of the community had been reduced to a 
hapless labour tenancy on land that they had once held as their own.285 
 
The court then focused on the community’s claim. The court stated that the 
community had on occasion had made reference to the dispossession of their 
customary law ownership over the subject land. However, since the loss of the 
customary law ownership occurred in 1889, this type of dispossession, according 
to both the Restitution of Land Rights Act and the Constitution, had no redress.286 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court stated that regard should still be had to the 
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history of land dispossessions before the cut-off date of 19 June 1913 in order to 
give the correct approach to the historical context before the cut-off date.287 As 
will appear from the discussion below, this approach is central to the success of 
the Popela land claim, since it implies that the court not only recognises the 
existence of a right that survived the original colonisation, but interprets that right 
in a way that makes it possible to formulate a restitution claim under the Act with 
regard to the second dispossession, which followed after the cut-off date. 
 
The court resolved that the claimants were a community at the time when they 
were dispossessed of their customary law ownership of the subject land in 1889, 
and that they were still a community when, in 1969, they were once again 
dispossessed of the remaining right in the land, which was in the form of labour 
tenancy.288 
 
Beginning with the notion that the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 
should be “understood purposively because it is remedial legislation that is linked 
umbilically to the Constitution”,289 the Constitutional Court approached the appeal 
from a holistic perspective. It held that the tenuous land rights that the community 
retained in the form of labour tenancy was the result of a “grid of integrated 
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repressive laws that were aimed at furthering the government’s policy of racial 
discrimination.”290 The court took cognisance of the fact that the very existence of 
the system of labour tenancies, to begin with, was the result of racist laws and 
practices which had deprived black communities of land that they had previously 
owned. The Constitutional Court overturned the finding of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal that the 1969 dispossession of the labour tenancy right had not been the 
result of racially discriminatory laws and practices.291 The reasoning of the 
Constitutional Court was that the apartheid state advanced the rights of white 
landowners at the expense of black citizens. As such, even though the 
community’s 1969 labour tenancy dispossession had been by white landowners 
rather than a forced removal by the state, the dispossession was “tainted by the 
context that allowed and encouraged it to occur”.292 From this discussion, the 
Constitutional Court concluded that the second dispossession of the individual 
community members met all the requirements of both the Constitution and the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act, more so since the second dispossession of the 
labour tenancy right in 1969 fell within the cut-off date.293 
 
The Constitutional Court upheld the Popela community’s appeal against the 
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decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Constitutional Court issued a 
declaratory order to the effect that the individual community members were 
entitled to restitution for being dispossessed of their labour tenancy right in 
1969.294 The community claimed the land where their homesteads had stood as 
well as the land immediately around their homesteads. In addition, they claimed 
the entire land which they had used collectively for ploughing and for grazing.295 
The Constitutional Court on this basis granted a right of full ownership to the 
Popela community over the subject land. 
 
The Popela decision acknowledged the original dispossession of the full 
ownership in 1889, but focused on the weaker surviving right of the individual 
labour tenancies. The surviving weaker right was found to have survived the 
1913 cut-off date and was again the subject of a second dispossession under 
apartheid in 1969. Taking a purposive approach to interpretation, the 
Constitutional Court found that the individual community members, at the 
termination of the labour tenancies in 1969, had been effectively dispossessed of 
a right in land, after the cut-off date, and as a result of racially discriminatory laws 
or practices. Using this formulation, which regards loss of title and loss of 
sovereignty as distinct, the court was able to restore to the community the right of 
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full ownership.296 
 
4.4 Implications of the Decisions 
Arguably, the South African courts’ methodologies in the restitution of rights in 
land in the above cases draw upon the manner in which the Mabo and 
Delgamuukw decisions formulated a remedy for colonial land dispossessions in 
the form of the doctrine of aboriginal title. The position in Australia and Canada 
differed doctrinally from that in South Africa in that the Australian and Canadian 
courts had to invent a doctrinal foundation for restitution, subject to the restriction 
that they could not compromise the Crown’s sovereignty, whereas South African 
courts are constitutionally authorised and statutorily empowered to grant 
restitution orders, albeit subject to the cut-off date. Paradoxically, it is this same 
doctrinal difference which in the end created an avenue for the restoration of full 
rights in land for the Richtersveld and Popela communities. The implication of the 
Richtersveld and Popela decisions discussed above is that land claims can 
succeed within the Restitution of Land Rights Act framework, even in instances 
where the original colonial dispossession occurred prior to the 1913 cut-off date. 
This is with the added proviso that, in order to succeed with claims of this nature, 
the communities should have retained a form of use or occupation right which 
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survived the 1913 cut-off date but was later subject to a second dispossession 
under apartheid. Despite the differences, this kind of restitution remedy functions 
in a similar manner to the remedy for restitution in both Australia and Canada. 
Aboriginal title distinguishes between the loss of sovereignty and whatever rights 
and interests survived annexation. In this way, the Australian and Canadian 
courts are able to restore previously dispossessed lands, using the doctrine of 
aboriginal title. This approach is not unlike the South African distinction between 
the loss of the original ownership through colonisation and the surviving weaker 
right that is again dispossessed under apartheid. For South African courts, this 
formulation essentially strengthens the weaker right by turning it into a right that 
can be restored, even in the form of full ownership, within the Roman-Dutch law 
context of ownership. Although the full ownership right is based on Roman-Dutch 
law with its strong emphasis on the hierarchal structure of land ownership,297 the 
courts’ strategy also represents a fragmentation of proprietary interests, which is 
in essence a break from the hierarchal construct and serves to strengthen 
weaker rights.298 
 
In both Popela and Richtersveld, the communities were dispossessed of 
sovereignty and original ownership over their territories by colonising powers in 
the nineteenth century. This would have left their claims for restitution outside of 
the 1913 cut-off date, as the decisions in the courts a quo have proved. However, 
the courts elected to focus on the remaining incidents of ownership of which 
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communities were again dispossessed later. This strategy employed by the 
South African courts is not unlike the one used by the Australian High Court in 
Mabo which, instead of focusing on the dispossession of original ownership 
during annexation, focused on the effects of 1982 and 1985 legislation which 
would have dispossessed the Merriam people of their few remaining incidents of 
aboriginal title after the loss of sovereignty.  
 
In considering the surviving rights after loss of sovereignty, the Mabo decision 
referred to the sociological aspects of the aboriginal group such as their shared 
rules on how the land was used and managed. The South African courts in both 
Popela and Richtersveld employed a similar formulation. The two thousand 
strong members of the Richtersveld community were able to prove a lasting 
coherence and an accepted communality dating centuries before contact with the 
colonising powers. This aspect of communality, coupled with a shared right of 
usage of the subject land, influenced the respective courts into characterising the 
community’s interest in the land as firstly beneficial occupation, then a customary 
law interest and finally an indigenous law interest in the land. It can also be 
interpreted to be the court’s attempt at strengthening the right by moulding it from 
a lesser beneficial occupation to a customary law interest which is so strong that 
it is “[a]kin to ownership at common law”299 and finally an indigenous law interest 
which is a full right of ownership without the crutch of the common law. 
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By interpreting the surviving use right contextually, the South African courts 
avoided the danger of recognising a right that survived colonisation but could not 
satisfy the restitution requirements in the Act. In discussing whether the Popela 
claimants could be deemed a community, the Constitutional Court stated that 
over time, the composition and cohesiveness of dispossessed communities 
would be eroded. Hence requirements such as an accepted tribal identity or life 
under the authority of a chief would only serve to hinder the purpose of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.300 For the Constitutional Court, the proof of 
community was by way of a “[s]ufficiently cohesive group of persons to show that 
there is a community or a part of a community, regard being had to the nature 
and likely impact of the original dispossession on the group; and that some 
element of commonality between the claiming community and the community as 
it was at the point of dispossession.”301 
 
In the Richtersveld decision the aspect of community was not in dispute, 
although the Constitutional Court relied on the indigenous aspect of the 
community as a means of asserting the nature of the interest in the land that the 
Richtersveld people held. 
 
For the Popela community, the Constitutional Court had to consider historical 
evidence in order to finally find that the nine individuals were indeed a 
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community. In this regard, existing literature mostly focuses on the implications of 
the doctrine of aboriginal title as a means of land restitution in South Africa.302 As 
yet, no literature exists that examines the manner in which the South African 
courts were influenced by the Mabo approach by fragmenting proprietary 
interests in order to make an award for restitution of rights in land previously 
dispossessed. However, the similarities are striking. 
 
The methods for proving traditional laws and customs in the South African cases 
are also similar to those used to establish aboriginal title. Both the Richtersveld 
and Popela decisions used language that is used to prove the elements of a land 
claim based on aboriginal title. Aboriginal title demands that there be use or 
occupation rights that survived the Crown sovereignty and resultant loss of title. 
In the Richtersveld and Popela decisions discussed in this chapter, the courts 
focussed on the manner in which both communities carried out their day to day 
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activities. They were found to have had a distinct social and political structure 
which included laws governing the land. For the Richtersveld community this 
relationship to the land translated into a customary law interest, whereas for the 
Popela community it was an occupation right based on labour tenancy. Using this 
formulation both communities therefore had a right that survived the 1913 cut-off 
date. As such, their land claims were made possible in terms of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act. 
 
It has been pointed out above that there are important differences between the 
South African context and the context within which the doctrine of aboriginal title 
was developed in Australian and Canadian case law, but that there are 
nevertheless striking similarities in the logic and language employed by the 
courts in all three cases. The most significant difference is of course the fact that 
the Australian and Canadian courts had to formulate the doctrine of aboriginal 
title simply to make restitution of historical dispossessions at all possible, while 
the South African courts employed the distinction between the colonial 
dispossession of title and the subsequent apartheid dispossession of use rights 
as a way of getting around the obstacle of the 1913 cut-off date. The most 
important similarity is the fact that all three sets of courts relied on a 
fragmentation of property title in the sense of distinguishing between different 
aspects of title that were dispossessed and retained at various points, as well as 
the historically sensitive and purposive interpretation of the surviving use rights, 
in view of the nature and scope of the pre-colonial indigenous rights, through 
  
 
100
analysis of the elements of indigeneity, community and custom. In Australia and 
Canada, this strategy allowed restitution claims without any constitutional or 
statutory foundation; in South Africa, it allowed courts to go behind the apparently 
forbidding 1913 cut-off date and consider restitution claims for dispossessions 
that started during colonisation but continued after the cut-off date through their 
systemic and dogmatic effects. 
 
4.5 Alternative Approaches to Richtersveld and Popela? 
Arguably, a large number of historically based land claims can be brought within 
the framework of the Restitution of Land Rights Act by using the logic of 
Richtersveld and Popela. Needless to say, there must be an interest surviving 
the original dispossession for this strategy to work at all. Should there be no 
surviving interest, then this formulation would not be of assistance as the cut-off 
date cannot be done away with. Indeed, the Constitutional Court in Richtersveld 
stated in no uncertain terms that the limit of the retroactivity of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act was set at 19 June 1913. The implication of this is that the 
Constitutional Court intends that all claims for land restitution should be dealt with 
under the Restitution of Land Rights Act.  
 
However, in terms of the notion of a reversionary right, although a private law 
concept, one could argue that ownership has not been extinguished and 
therefore survived the cut-off date to be again dispossessed under apartheid, 
even when the original owners did not retain any use or occupation rights with 
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regard to the land. Within this formulation, the reversionary right could have been 
dispossessed under apartheid and can still be restored using the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act. Cowen303 describes the reversionary right as the “elasticity of 
ownership” since, regardless of the limitations placed on ownership and the 
number of subtractions from the dominium, the owner will still maintain the 
reversionary right. It is a vested right which reverts to the owner once the various 
subtractions end. Arguably, this approach is better suited in the private law arena 
than for large scale land reform,304 but it is worth while considering it as the basis 
of a restitution claim under the Act, where the original owners were dispossessed 
prior to the cut-off date with a remaining entitlement. 
  
Some authors have stated that the doctrine of aboriginal title can be used in 
South Africa, outside of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, to allow historical land 
claims that were lost in dispossessions that took place prior to the cut-off date. 
For communities dispossessed of their original right in land without any surviving 
use rights, particularly where the dispossession occurred just before the cut-off 
date, it may be necessary to discuss whether and how the doctrine of aboriginal 
title can function within the South African context. As yet, the South African 
judiciary has not expressed a decisive opinion as to whether a land claim based 
on aboriginal title can succeed, although the Constitutional Court has indicated 
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quite strongly in Richtersveld that this might not be possible.  
 
Academics such as Bennett and Powell305 and Hoq306 favour the application of 
the doctrine of aboriginal title regardless of whether or not it forms part of the 
common law. Others, such as Mostert and Fitzpatrick307 and Lehmann,308 are of 
the view that the Restitution of Land Rights Act does not provide redress for 
colonial land dispossessions prior to the cut-off date. Nonetheless, Bennett and 
Powell assert the viewpoint that by virtue of aboriginal title being part of 
customary international law it naturally is a part of South African law.309 This view 
seems to suggest that the cut off date which precludes aboriginal title 
contravenes international law. It may be said that the promulgation of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act probably complied with South Africa’s obligations 
in that regard. The cut-off date does not imply a contravention unless it is 
imposed arbitrarily or works unfairly. The discussion on the case reflects that it is 
not the case. In Australia, aboriginal title post the Mabo ruling has become a 
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limited right with the advent of the Native Title Act.310 Furthermore, very few 
cases on aboriginal title have been decided by the courts, with most claims being 
settled by way of negotiation between the aboriginal communities and the federal 
governments.311 This is attributed to the lack of political will on the part of the 
government to fully recognise aboriginal title. Despite the legal and administrative 
processes established by the Native Title Act, very little land has been claimed 
successfully.312  
 
In the Richtersveld313 Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court 
decisions, the courts followed some principles which are said to be key in 
grounding a claim for aboriginal title. The decisions reflect that South African law 
recognises rights to land which have their source in the traditional laws and 
customs of indigenous people. In addition, these decisions established, for South 
African law, the principle that a mere change in sovereignty does not unsettle 
pre-existing rights in land. This aspect of the Richtersveld decisions suggests, for 
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Patterson,314 that South African courts may have begun to recognise aboriginal 
as a part of South African law. Moreover, in finding that at the time of annexation, 
the Richtersveld people had a communal customary law interest whose source 
lay in “the traditional laws and customs of the Richtersveld people”, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal315 noted the similarity between this customary law interest and 
an aboriginal title right, saying; 
 
“Like the customary law interest that I have found was held by the 
Richtersveld community, aboriginal title is rooted in and is the 
‘creature of traditional laws and customs.”316 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Richtersveld made reference to the Mabo 
decision where Brennan J rejected the time honoured view in In re Southern 
Rhodesia317 that some indigenous people are insufficiently civilised to have 
recognisable property rights. Like Mabo, the Constitutional Court adopted 
Brennan J’s viewpoint and found that the Richtersveld community’s customary 
law rights in the subject land were recognised as such and that they had survived 
annexation. Finally, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the government’s 
failure to recognise the Richtersveld community’s rights in land, based as it were 
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on the ground of ‘insufficient civilisation’ after diamonds were discovered was 
racially discriminatory. The Richtersveld community was entitled, under the 
Restitution Act, to restitution of their rights in land. 
 
Pienaar compares the Delgamuukw decision to the Richtersveld decision and 
notes the similarities between aboriginal title and indigenous law. His conclusion 
in the comparison is to ask “is it the same concept with a different name?”318 This 
implies, like Bennett and Powell suggest,319 that aboriginal title is a part of South 
African law. 
 
In contrast to Canada and Australia, the South African government has proved its 
commitment to land reform.320 The Restitution of Land Rights Act is far better 
placed to assist communities to obtain a more secure title than the judicially 
created and somewhat insecure doctrine of aboriginal title. In fact, in the Popela 
decision, the government was a litigant, alongside the Popela community, in the 
community’s quest for restitution. With the full ownership remedy for previously 
dispossessed lands, communities are able to form new relationships with land – 
for example communities that form joint investment ventures with the landowner 
after a successful restitution award. This is not unlike the Richtersveld community 
becoming major shareholders in South Africa’s largest mining corporation as part 
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of the settlement. Aboriginal title, on the other hand, demands that communities 
use the land in a manner that is compatible with their title. Once land use 
patterns change, then the title is said to revert back to the state. 
 
Therefore, from the discussion above it is apparent that the courts used the 
doctrine of aboriginal title in order to formulate a unique logic which would ensure 
the inclusion of historically based land claims within the restitution process. 
However, to conclude, as some academics have, that the doctrine has come to 
be applicable in South Africa is maybe premature. In any event, as has been 
discussed, the doctrine of aboriginal title, because of its sovereignty handicap, 
arguably does not have the same wide ranging reach that, ironically, its logic 
suggests. South African courts, without the sovereignty handicap, have made 
use of the logic in order to craft a remedy for historically based land claims. In 
any event – notwithstanding the perceived difficulties of the doctrine of aboriginal 
title, the doctrine, within the South African context, is unnecessary. The crux of 
this chapter is that the Richtersveld and Popela formulation functions as the 
preferable tool with which to bring historically based land claims into the 
legislative framework. 
 
In concluding the discussion on possible alternatives to the Richtersveld and 
Popela formulation, the 1913 cut-off date reflects a balance between correcting 
historic injustices on the one hand and maintaining public confidence in the 
markets on the other hand. In saying so, the cut-off date which acts as a 
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limitation on the rights to land restitution bears testament to the view that not all 
land dispossessions can be restored without some form of disruption to the social 
order. The formulation of the Richtersveld and Popela decisions can be said to 
reflect a nuanced understanding of the former. Fragmenting a proprietary interest 
to find a lesser interest which survived the cut-off date and was later subject to a 
second dispossession under apartheid arguably widens the scope of the 
restitution process by including claims which would otherwise have been 
excluded on the basis of the pre-1913 dispossession. The formulation is in line 
with the Restitution of Land Rights Act’s constitutional transformative essence. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
As the case discussion above reflects, there are marked similarities in the 
manner in which the South African courts and the Australian courts have 
adjudicated their historical land claims. The one obvious difference is that in 
South Africa, land claims are dealt with in terms of constitutionally mandated 
legislation with a cut-off date. The cut-off date appears to intentionally exclude 
historically based land claims. It then would appear as if aboriginal title might be 
a solution to the apparent exclusion of pre-1913 land dispossessions. As such, 
this chapter has discussed literature with a view to see whether aboriginal title 
can be applied in South Africa. In this regard, the conclusion, based on 
Australian and Canadian experiences, suggests that it is a limited right and 
therefore falling short of the wider transformative aspirations of the land reform 
programme in South Africa. That being said, a remaining question is whether 
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there are still historic land dispossessions which cannot be remedied using the 
Richtersveld and Popela formulation discussed in sections 4.2 to 4.4 of the 
Chapter. A reversionary right was discussed as a possible solution to such 
instances, but because it is primarily a private law function, it may not be suitable 
within the land reform programme. In this regard, the conclusion is that there may 
well be instances where restitution for a historical land dispossession is not 
possible. Such an instance would arise when original ownership right has been 
stripped of all its incidents without any surviving rights. Recourse may then be in 
the form of either land redistribution or a secure form of tenure, which are the 
other two trajectories of the land reform programme. 
 
However, the thrust of this thesis is that there is no need to resort to the doctrine 
of aboriginal title in redressing pre-1913 land dispossessions. This is because 
1913 cut-off date does not preclude historically based land claims. The 
fragmentation of proprietary interests by the Constitutional Court in both the 
Richtersveld and Popela decisions, in a manner with some resemblance to the 
Mabo and Delgamuukw decisions, offers a more flexible approach to historically 
based land claims, albeit within the 1913 cut-off date.  
 
Bearing in mind the temporal nature of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, there 
could arguably be instances in which applicants cannot bring their land claims 
within the Richtersveld and Popela framework. As the claims have now been 
closed under the Act, new claims are not possible. The Richtersveld and Popela 
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framework largely affects as yet undecided claims. The original date by which 
land claims had to be lodged was 30 April 1998 but was later extended to 31 
December 1998 due to the low volumes of lodged claims. It may just well be that 
the common law can be developed to include the doctrine of aboriginal title as 
previously suggested by some academics, since aboriginal title is accepted as 
practice of customary international law.  
 
It appears as if the rationale for the sunset clause in the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act is that existing landowners require certainty as to their title to land. 
The Chief Land Claims Commissioner in public hearings on the Restitution 
Amendment Bill, before the Portfolio Committee on Agricultural Land Affairs, 
expressed the view that the 31 December 1998 cut-off date had to be maintained 
in order to balance the property market so as to ensure economic stability.321  
 
Therefore, the implications of the above decisions call for a revised 
understanding of the 1913 cut-off date and its impact on historically based land 
claims. Pre-1913 land dispossessions are not necessarily excluded from the 
restitution process. Chapter 5, by way of concluding the thesis will summarise the 
findings in the previous chapters and will also answer the question as to how far 
the courts can interpret the 1913 cu-off date in order to include historically based 
land claims. 
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5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to find out whether it is possible, in South African law, and 
particularly given the framework established by the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act322 and the 1913 cut-off date, to consider restitution claims that are based on 
land dispossessions that took place prior to the statutory cut-off date of 1913, or 
whether claims of this nature are excluded by the cut-off date. This thesis also 
set to out to establish what the best theoretical foundation for adjudication of 
these claims is, should it be found that it is possible to include them in the 
restitution framework.  
 
The Richtersveld323 and Popela324 decisions of the lower courts appear to 
dismiss the land claims due to the pre-1913 dispossession of the original 
ownership right. On appeal, these land claims succeed. In granting the claims the 
courts followed a formulation which is not unlike that of the Canadian 
Delgamuukw325 and the Australian Mabo326 decisions. Based on this logic, it was 
shown that the 1913 cut-off date does not, as it may appear, exclude historically 
based land claims absolutely. An attempt has been made to show that the 
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323
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324
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constitutionally mandated Restitution of Land Rights Act327 should be given a 
wide or purposive interpretation to enable the courts to provide redress for 
individuals and groups that have been the victims of both colonial and apartheid 
land dispossessions. If the Act is interpreted purposively, it should be possible to 
apply the processes foreseen in the Act in a way that would include, rather than 
exclude, at least some dispossessions that started prior to the 1913 cut-off date 
but that continued to affect the position of the occupiers long after the cut-off date 
through the weakening effect that the colonial dispossession had on the 
occupiers’ land rights.  
 
This aim of this chapter is to summarise the most important findings and 
conclusions made in previous chapters in order to answer the question on just 
how far the courts can go in interpreting the cut-off date so as to include pre-
1913 restitution claims in the land restitution process. 
 
5.2 The 1913 Cut-Off Date and its Implications 
The thesis commenced with a discussion on the history of land dispossessions in 
South Africa, noting how the major colonial land dispossessions took place prior 
to 19 June 1913.328 The chapter also discussed the various legislative tools that 
were used in order to effect a second wave of land dispossessions during the 
apartheid era. These legislative tools included the Black Land Act of 1913, whose 
date of commencement the cut-off date is modelled after. The reasoning behind 
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the cut-off date is that the Black Land Act329 is said to be the first key legislative 
tool that saw the country’s surface area divided according to racial grouping, and 
that restitution should therefore take the date upon which this Act became 
operative as its point of departure. In the end, the black population of South 
Africa was settled on just 13% of the surface area even though they constituted 
80% of the total population. 
 
The chapter then noted how the post-1994 democratic dispensation made land 
reform a focal point for transformation and development. The chapter also 
discussed how the policy framework document adopted by the new government, 
the White Paper on South African Land Policy, first set the cut-off date for 
restitution claims as 1913. The chapter also discussed the manner in which the 
cut-off date has been included in the 1996 Constitution330 and the constitutionally 
mandated Restitution of Land Rights Act. Various opinions were cited on the 
desirability of a cut-off date and it was indicated that the majority of 
commentators agreed that historically based land claims were left out of the 
restitution process for pragmatic reasons.331 The chapter also discussed how the 
courts dealt with the question of historically based land claims for the first time. 
The claims relating to dispossessions that took prior to 1913 were initially 
dismissed, which then raised the question whether aboriginal title could be the 
avenue for historically based land claims in South Africa. 
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5.3 The Doctrine of Aboriginal Title Explored 
It was noted that Australia and Canada did not have a cut-off date for their 
judicially conceived land claims processes. Their position was unlike the South 
African situation, which has to take cognisance of the cut-off date of 19 June 
1913 because the land restitution process is authorised by the Constitution and 
regulated by special legislation, both of which impose this cut-off date on the 
restitution process. A potential stumbling block for both Australia and Canada 
was the fact that the courts, in crafting remedies for the restoration of colonial 
land dispossessions, may not question the sovereignty of the Crown.332 
Therefore, Australian and Canadian courts used the English common law 
doctrine of tenure, in terms of which the Crown held radical title over all land, to 
distinguish between the effect that colonisation had on sovereignty and on title to 
land respectively. In terms of the doctrine of aboriginal title the original occupiers’ 
surviving title in the land was then said to act as a burden on the underlying 
Crown title. The chapter identified as the most important aspect of this 
formulation of the problem the view that a change in sovereignty did not 
extinguish prior titles to land. Hence, by giving due recognition to the surviving 
interests after the loss of sovereignty, the Mabo decision assigned a proprietary 
nature to such surviving interest and a restitution claim became possible. On this 
basis, it was said that the aboriginal title had survived the original dispossession 
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that took place when the Crown established sovereignty.333 Using this 
formulation, a right of full ownership was restored in the restitution process. Thus, 
having discussed the doctrine of aboriginal title in Australia and Canada, the 
thesis then considered the question whether the doctrine of aboriginal title had a 
place in South Africa. 
 
5.4 Aboriginal Title in South Africa? 
Chapter 4 argued that there is no need for the doctrine of aboriginal title within 
the South African context, since the distinction between original dispossession 
and surviving rights, which may have been inspired by the decisions in 
Delgamuukw and Mabo, could be used to successfully restore previously 
dispossessed full rights of ownership within the ambit of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act. The chapter noted the doctrinal differences between the South 
African land restitution process and that of Australia and Canada.334 The latter 
land claims processes, not being governed by legislation, do not have a cut-off 
date and in crafting a remedy for colonial land dispossessions, the courts had to 
construct a remedy that would not compromise the sovereignty of the Crown, 
since the Crown acquired not just sovereignty, but also title to land when it 
colonised the territory. Since the sovereignty of the Crown cannot be challenged 
by municipal courts, it would have meant that indigenous populations 
dispossessed of land at the establishment of sovereignty would have had no 
restitution claim. Accordingly, the doctrine of aboriginal title is premised upon the 
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idea that there is a distinction between the loss of sovereignty and the loss of 
title. The surviving incidents of aboriginal title are said to be a burden on the 
underlying Crown’s radical title. In this formulation, the sovereignty of the Crown 
is left intact while restitution becomes possible.335  
 
Regarding South Africa, it was noted that the courts, unlike those of Australia and 
Canada, do not have to deal with the sovereignty question, since there is 
legislative framework for the restitution of previously dispossessed land.336 It was 
noted that the 1913 cut-off date for restitution claims appears to intentionally 
exclude historically based land claims. It would then appear as if aboriginal title 
can be a solution to the apparent exclusion of pre-1913 land dispossessions. 
Literature in which it was suggested that the doctrine of aboriginal title could or 
should be used to bring pre-1913 restitution claims into the restitution process 
was discussed to see whether aboriginal title can be applied in South African law. 
In response to this suggestion, the chapter points out that the Richtersveld and 
Popela appeal decisions suggest that historically based land claims are not, after 
all, excluded from the restitution process automatically.337 Importantly, these 
decisions followed an approach that recognised a weaker right which, having 
survived the original dispossession under colonial dispossession was then the 
subject of a second dispossession under apartheid. In the restitution process the 
courts can focus upon the second dispossession to bring the claim within the cut-
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off date, while focusing on the whole dispossession process, including the 
original colonial dispossession, in order to restore full ownership rights. Equally 
important is the fact that all this took place within the framework of the Restitution 
of Land Rights Act. The formulation, which can be said to rely on a fragmentation 
of proprietary interests, is not unlike the Mabo and Delgamuukw logic previously 
discussed. 
 
In granting the claims for restitution, the appeal courts focused on a weaker 
(mostly use) right that was held to have survived the initial dispossession of the 
stronger right of ownership and that could satisfy the requirements of the Act.338 
Since the surviving right was again dispossessed after 1913, the claims met the 
requirements of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. By identifying and then 
focusing on weaker use rights that are said to have survived the original (mostly 
colonial) dispossession of ownership or sweeping indigenous land rights, the 
courts opened the possibility of considering restitution claims in cases that might 
otherwise seem to be excluded from the ambit of the Restitution Act. 
 
 A further question was whether there are still historic land dispossessions which 
cannot be remedied using the Richtersveld and Popela formulation. The notion of 
a reversionary right of ownership was raised as a possible solution for such 
instances.339 In addition, there may be instances where restitution for a historical 
land dispossession is simply not possible within the framework of the Act. Such 
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an instance would arise when the original ownership right has been stripped of all 
its incidents without any surviving rights. Recourse may then be in the form of 
either land redistribution or a secure form of tenure, which are the other two 
trajectories of the land reform programme. 
 
However, the thrust of this thesis has been that there is no need to resort to the 
doctrine of aboriginal title in redressing pre-1913 land dispossessions. This is 
because, firstly, the 1913 cut-off date does not absolutely preclude historically 
based land claims. The fragmentation of proprietary interests by the 
Constitutional Court in both the Richtersveld and Popela decisions, with some 
resemblance to the Mabo and Delgamuukw decisions, offers a more flexible 
approach to historically based land claims, albeit within the 1913 cut-off date. 
Secondly, it is argued that remaining claims might be better solved within the 
redistribution programmes. 
 
Therefore, the implications of the Richtersveld and Popela decisions call for a 
revised understanding of the 1913 cut-off date and its impact on historically 
based land claims. Pre-1913 land dispossessions are not necessarily excluded 
from the restitution process.340  
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5.5 Conclusion 
The thesis has attempted to answer the question as to just how far the courts can 
go in interpreting the cut-off date to include historically based land claims. When 
an incident of the original full ownership right survived the original colonial 
dispossession, and is then dispossessed again after 1913 in terms of racially 
discriminatory laws, this second dispossession can form the basis of a restitution 
claim within the restitution process. Arguably, it does not matter when the original 
dispossession took place, since the formulation of the restitution claim is 
dependent on fact that the weaker right survived the cut-off date. The formulation 
of the Richtersveld and Popela land claims widens the scope of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act, which in light of its being constitutionally mandated legislation 
must arguably play a transformative role. In this regard, there is no need for the 
doctrine of aboriginal title in South African law, since the logic of drawing a 
distinction between the loss of sovereignty and the loss of rights in land functions 
within the legislative framework. In so far as the Restitution of Land Rights Act, 
due to practical economic considerations such as the desire for certainty of 
ownership, is of a temporal nature and new claims are no longer permitted, the 
South African common law might perhaps be developed in order to permit the 
land the doctrine of aboriginal title. It is perhaps the only instance in which a 
claim for restitution might be brought outside the framework of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act. 
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